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DEPORTATION IS DIFFERENT
Peter L. Markowitz*
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that deportation
proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. As a result, none of the nearly 400,000
individuals who were deported last year enjoyed any of the constitutional protections afforded to
criminal defendants under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments. Among those 400,000 were
numerous detained juveniles and mentally ill individuals who, as a result of the civil designation,
were forced to navigate the labyrinth of immigration law alone, without appointed counsel. Others
were lawul permanent residents who had pled guilty to minor offenses upon the correct advice of
counsel that they could not be deported-only to have Congress, unbound by the criminal
prohibition against ex post facto laws, retroactively changed the law and subject them to
deportation. The dichotomy between the gravity of the liberty interest at stake in these
proceedings-a lifetime of exile from homes and families in the United States-and the relative
dearth of procedural protections afforded respondents, has always been intuitively unjust to many.
However, over the past twenty years, as immigration and criminal law have become intertwined as
never before, the intuitive sense of many has matured into a scholarly movement exploring the
criminalization of immigration laie. This movement has taken aim at the incoherence of
Leportation's civil designation.
Until recently, there was little reason to think the Supreme Court would wade into the waters of the
resurgent debate over the nature of deportation proceedings. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct.
1473 (2010), however, the Court surprised almost everyone as it went to great length to chrnicle
the criminalization of immigration law and ultimately concluded that deportation is "uniquely
difficult to classify." The immediate impact of the Padilla decision is the critical recognition that
criminal defendants have a right to be advised by their attorneys if a plea they are contemplating
will result in deportation. However, I argue, that in time Padilla may come to stand for
something much more significant in immigration jurisprudence. When we read Padilla in the
context of the Supreme Court s evolving immigration jurisprudence, there is good reason to believe
that it is a critical pivot point for the Court. Padilla marks the beginning of a significant
reconceptualization of the nature of deportation toward the realization that it is neither truly civil
nor criminal. Rather, deportation is different. It is a unique legal animal that lives in the crease
between the civil and criminal labels. This Article explores the evolving arch of Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the quasi-criminal nature of deportation proceedings and articulates a
principled mechanism to define the scope of the rights afforded to individuals facing deportation
under this new framework.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1977, the Supreme Court famously declared that "death
is ... different"'-signaling that death penalty prosecutions stand
alone as a unique category of adjudications that require a set of rules
I Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("[Death] is different in both its severity
and its finality.").
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all their own. In 2010, the Supreme Court took a significant step to-
ward, once again, carving out a class of adjudications that defy com-
mon categorization, as it endorsed the argument that "deportation is
different."2 The Court's holding in Padilla v. Kentucky marked a re-
markable and sensible expansion of an individual's right to be ad-
vised by her criminal defense attorneys if she is contemplating a plea
that could subject her to deportation. However, the impact of this
narrow holding could, in time, pale in comparison to Padilla's impact
on our conception of deportation. I argue in this article that in the
immediate aftermath of the Padilla decision, commentators have
failed to appreciate the way the decision appears to signal the begin-
ning of a dramatic pivot away from precedent regarding the "purely
civil"5 nature of deportation proceedings. While the Padilla Court
continued to give lip service to its prior jurisprudence declaring de-
portation "civil," it qualified this categorization as "nevertheless inti-
mately related to the criminal process" and ultimately concluded de-
portation is "uniquely difficult to classify."" What emerges from this
discussion is the realization that deportation does not fit neatly into
the civil or criminal box, but rather that it lives in the netherworld in
between. This modern, more refined, and, ultimately, more persua-
sive understanding of deportation will both allow courts to reconcile
previously incoherent doctrine and plot a course for the more robust
judicial protection of the rights of immigrants facing deportation.
It is difficult to understate the import of the civil or criminal label
for immigrants facing deportation. The stakes in deportation pro-
ceedings are grave. Lawful immigrants can face life sentences of ba-
nishment from their homes, families, and livelihoods in the United
States and can potentially be sent to countries they have not visited
since childhood, where they: have no family, do not speak the lan-
2 Brief of Petitioner at 54, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009
WL 1497552; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-82 (2010) ("Deportation
as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the crimi-
nal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.").
3 The decision was remarkable because it adopted the position of a few outlier courts
against the great weight of authority holding that defense counsel had no affirmative duty
to advise client of the immigration consequences of contemplated dispositions. See infra
notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
4 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486-87.
5 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (emphasizing the civil designation of removal proceedings); Li Sing
v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (same); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) (same).
6 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
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guage, and can face serious persecution or death. Notwithstanding
the gravity of the liberty deprivation at issue, as a result of the civil la-
bel currently applied to deportation proceedings, poor immigrants
have no right to appointed counsel (despite the notorious complexity
of immigration law);5 immigrants have no protection against retroac-
tive changes in the law (they can plead guilty to minor offenses based
upon the correct advice of counsel that they will not be deported and
the next day Congress can change the rules);9 immigrants have no
right to have their proceedings in any particular venue (instead the
government can whisk immigrants away into detention thousands of
miles away from their home where they lack access to the counsel,
evidence, and witnesses they need to prevail in their removal pro-
ceeding);'o and immigrants can be deported for the most minor of-
fenses, such as turnstile jumping or shoplifting candy (without any
constitutional limit on the disproportionate punishment)." The
7 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) ("[D]eportation may result in the loss of
all that makes life worth living." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("[Deportation] may result result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living."); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling
the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Affroach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 295, 338, 346 (2008) (discussing the
serious deprivation of liberty that accompanies deportation).
8 See discussion infra Part I.C; see also Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (describ-
ing removal proceedings as a "labyrinthine character of modern immigration law-a
maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that engender waste, delay, and confu-
sion for the Government and petitioners alike").
9 See ex postfacto cases cited infra note 68.
10 See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation:
Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556-58 (2009) ("DHS
regularly transfers detainees to faraway remote detention facilities, often making multiple
transfers for a single detainee, without regard to whether the detainee has obtained
counsel in his current location.... Motions to change venue to return a client to a facility
in a jurisdiction where she has previously obtained counsel are frequently denied."); see
also DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CusToMs ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONs 6 (2009), available at http://www.ice.
gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf ("Although the majority of
arrestees are placed in facilities in the field office where they are arrested, significant de-
tention shortages exist .... When this occurs, arrestees are transferred to areas where
there are surplus beds.").
I See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (2006) (providing for the deportation of individuals con-
victed of crimes involving moral turpitude); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is inapplicable in removal proceedings because they are civil); Mojica v. Reno, 970
F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (classifying turnstile jumping in the New York City
subway system leading to a "theft of services" misdemeanor conviction as a "crime of mor-
al turpitude," subject to deportation (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ablett v. Brow-
nell, 240 F.2d 625, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("[P]etty theft [is] a crime which does involve
moral turpitude within the meaning of the immigration laws."); In re Scarpulla, 15 1. & N.
Dec. 139, 140-41 (1974) ("It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty,
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Court has noted that such rules "bristle[] with severities" but has nev-
ertheless held that the civil label mandates such outcomes.
The Padilla case arose in the context of a long-term lawful perma-
nent resident who had been arrested in Kentucky with a large quanti-
ty of marijuana and pled guilty, allegedly in reliance upon his attor-
ney's affirmative misadvice that the plea would not lead to his
deportation. In reality, the plea subjected Mr. Padilla to mandatory
deportation. The overwhelming majority of state and lower federal
courts had held that, under the Sixth Amendment, defense attorneys
have no obligation to advise their criminal defense clients regarding
the "collateral" immigration consequences of a contemplated plea
but that the delivery of affirmative misadvice is ineffective assistance
of counsel.'3 The Kentucky Supreme Court went in a different direc-
tion and held that even affirmative misadvice did not violate the Sixth
Amendment because "collateral consequences are outside the scope
of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" and,
therefore, it held "that counsel's failure to advise Appellee of such
collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no
basis for relief."' 4
In its decision, the United States Supreme Court first went to con-
siderable lengths to chronicle the evolution of deportation over the
course of the twentieth century and concluded that deportation has
become a dramatically more frequent and automatic result of crimi-
nal convictions. 5 The Court then considered the Kentucky Supreme
Court's reliance upon the collateral consequences doctrine. That
doctrine, which was developed in the context of the Fifth Amend-
ment, dictates that in order for a defendant to knowingly and intelli-
gently waive her right to trial in accordance with due process, she
must be informed of the direct, but not the collateral consequences,
of her plea.'" The issue of whether a consequence is direct or colla-
teral is closely related to whether the consequence is a form of crimi-
has always been held to involve moral turpitude."). See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Pro-
portionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PiTT. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (discussing the need for constitutional proportionality analysis in immigra-
tion removal proceedings).
12 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952); see also infra note 57.
13 See, e.g., Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); People v.
Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ill. 1985); Morales v. Texas, 910 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995); see also infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
14 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
15 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
16 See discussion infra notes 154-66.
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nal punishment or not." It is in this context that the Padilla Court
came to grapple with the difficult task of attempting to categorize the
nature of deportation. Ultimately, the Court avoided holding square-
ly on the issue by instead concluding that the "collateral versus direct
distinction is ... ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland' claim concerning
the specific risk of deportation." 9 In its discussion of the collateral
consequences doctrine, however, the Court, for the first time in over
a century, chimed in on the forgotten debate about the criminal or
civil nature of deportation. In so doing, it recognized the "unique
nature of deportation," and because deportation is now "an automat-
ic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders," the Court declared
it "'most difficult' to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the
deportation context."20 Eventually, the Court went on to hold on
other grounds that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assis-
tance includes an affirmative obligation to warn defendants of the
deportation consequences of a contemplated plea.2 '
Prior to Padilla, the first and last reasoned consideration of the
civil or criminal nature of deportation proceedings by the Supreme
Court came in 1893 in the Fong Yue Ting v. United States decision.2 In
that case, the Court considered whether three Chinese residents of
the United States were entitled to criminal procedural protections
when facing deportation for failing to comply with a registration law
requiring "one credible white witness. A divided Court held that
criminal constitutional protections "have no application" in deporta-
tion proceedings. The Court's reasoning in Fong Yue Ting rested on
an extra-constitutional inherent powers theory that has since been
discredited by scholars25 and by the Court itself.26 Nevertheless, in the
17 Id.
18 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the controlling two-part
test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
19 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
20 Id. at 1481.
21 Id. at 1483 ("[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give cor-
rect advice is equally clear."). See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
22 149 U.S. 698 (1893); cf Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (treating exclusion-not
deportation-proceedings as civil).
23 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699.
24 Id. at 730.
25 See LOUIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19-20 (1996)
(explaining that the notion that "the new United States government was to have major
powers outside the Constitution is not intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records
of the Convention, in the Federalist Papers, or in contemporary debates"); HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (summarizing the "withering criticism" of the inherent powers
theory); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
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century since Fong Yue Ting, the federal courts have declined every
opportunity and urging to reexamine the nature of removal proceed-
*27ings -until now.
In contrast, scholars have been calling for a reexamination of the
nature of deportation for some time and with increasing frequency
since the dramatic expansion of criminal deportation grounds in
1996.28 A handful of scholars have specifically urged that removal
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 121 ("Thus, the external sovereignty argument for unlimited
power over immigration was flawed to begin with and carries even less persuasive force
today."); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 21 (1998) (noting
the pervasive critique of the extra-constitutional theory of immigration law that "[m]any
have commented upon its persistence and almost all have vigorously condemned it"); Sa-
rah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 253 (2002) ("But the
Court's doctrinal justifications for the holdings ultimately are unsatisfying as an explana-
tion for the resort to inherent powers.... International law simply had nothing to say
about the extent to which domestic law might constrain governmental power."); see also T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBIANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE,
AN) AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 152 (2002); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 862
(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625,
1631 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YAI.E L.J. 545, 564-76 (1990).
26 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) ("Our Constitution governs us and we must
never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically
granted. . . ."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source." (footnote
omitted)); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 316-20 (discussing the Supreme Court's growing
unease with theories of extra-constitutional power); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
27 See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952); Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993); Cabral-Avila
v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630,
630 (2d Cir. 1926); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 25, at 153; Markowitz, supra note 7, at
316-20. But see United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting
that deportation is not a civil action but rather a criminal punishment when it is ordered,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1), by a federal judge sentencing a defendant for a crimi-
nal conviction).
28 See, e.g.,Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Prac-
tice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 116
(1999) ("Despite one hundred years of case law consistently holding that deportation is
not punishment, criticism of this conclusion has been ample throughout court opinions
as well as scholarly articles."); Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The "Uncivil" Nature of Deportation:
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34-35
(1978) (arguing that "deportation proceedings should be deemed criminal or quasi-
criminal" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Con-
trol, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 1890, 1893-94 (2000) (noting that, under various criminal law theories, "deporta-
tion of long-term lawful permanent residents for post-entry criminal conduct seems in
most respects to be a form of punishment"); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path ofImmi-
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proceedings straddle the civil-criminal divide with some removal pro-
ceedings akin to criminal proceedings and others akin to civil pro-
ceedings.29  And others have urged that removal be treated as quasi-
criminal.30 Now, for the first time in American history, the Court has
begun to align itself with these commentators, suggesting that depor-
gration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of CriminalJustice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469,
471 (2007) ("The underlying theories of deportation increasingly resemble those of crim-
inal punishment."); Lisa Mendel, The Court's Failure to Recognize Deportation as Punishment:
A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 205, 207 (2000)
(asking for a renewed critique of the Supreme Court's view that deportation is not pu-
nishment due to Congressional legislation in 1996 that greatly expanded the grounds on
which past crimes rendered lawful permanent residents deportable); Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure
Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 313 (2000) ("It is this refusal to give serious
consideration to the family rights at stake that makes deportation look much more like
punishment. . . ."); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the
True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 29, 32 (2003)
("This article argues that immigration removal proceedings are truly criminal in na-
ture."); Gregory L. Ryan, Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting: Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an
Aggravated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 989, 1010-12 (1997)
(concluding that deportation under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
qualifies as punishment under the judicial definition established in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958)); Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A
Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 245, 261-73 (2004) (tracing juri-
sprudence and legal theories supporting the contention that deportation is punishment);
Ethan Venner Torrey, "The Dignity of Crimes": Judicial Removal of Aliens and the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, 32 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 187, 188-91, 206 (1999) (proposing
that because two hundred years of case law defines deportation as civil, not criminal, U.S.
Attorneys should clarify in plea agreements that their prosecutions do not involve depor-
tation, which is instead a civil sanction wielded by the INS.); see also Developments in the
Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1386 (1983)
("[T]he categorization of deportation as a civil rather than criminal proceeding has been
severly criticized .. . ."). See generally Markowitz, supra note 7, at 289 (exploring "the ten-
sion between the firmly established civil label and the contrary [criminal-like] experience
of people subject to removal proceedings").
29 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 28, at 1893-98 (drawing a line between civil-like de-
portation laws that follow the border control model and criminal-like deportation laws
that follow the social control model); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 290-91 (distinguishing
between "exclusion proceedings" that are civil in nature and "explusion proceedings"
that are criminal in nature).
30 See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 28, at 160-63 (suggesting quasi-criminal treatment of de-
portation); Fragomen, Jr., supra note 27, at 34-35 (arguing that deportation proceedings
should be deemed criminal or quasi-criminal); Pauw, supra note 27, at 316-17 ("There is
a middle ground of 'quasi-criminal' cases in which some, but not all, of the constitutional
safeguards apply."); Pinzon, supra note 28, at 32 ("[R]emoval proceedings are more crim-
inal in nature . .. ."); Salinas, supra note 28, at 261-73 (arguing that certain retroactive
statutes, albeit civil in nature, can have such punitive consequences that they should be
constitutionally prohibited); Torrey, supra note 28, at 191 (asserting that criminal prose-
cutors' power over deportation undermines the characterization of deportation as civil).
1306 [Vol. 13:5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1666788
DEPORTATION IS DIlFFERENT
tation (but perhaps not exclusion) 3' may fall in the crease between
civil and criminal proceedings. The import of the Padilla Court's
characterizations comes into view when we consider it in contrast to
prior precedent and in the context of other evidence of the Court's
increasing discomfort with the civil label and its harsh application.
In this Article, I endeavor to do two things. First, I argue that
there is reason to be hopeful, that in the incrementalist modality of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, Padilla represents the first step-the
camel's nose under the tent-toward a full repudiation of Fong Yue
Ting. Second, I develop a framework courts could use to evaluate the
rights of respondents under the Padilla conception of deportation.
In regard to this latter endeavor, I argue that the unique nature of
deportation would require a method of assessing rights that borrows
from both the hard floor constitutional rights model, used in crimi-
nal proceedings, and the balancing model, Mathews v. Eldridge" analy-
sis, used in civil proceedings. This framework would require courts to
first determine whether the interests protected by a given criminal
procedure right are meaningfully at play in deportation proceedings.
If so, the heart of the analysis will turn upon consideration of the na-
ture of the deportation proceedings at issue and whether such pro-
ceedings warrant hard floor criminal-type protections. In order to
make this determination, courts must consider whether the level of
31 All formal proceedings by which the United States seeks to expel a noncitizen from with-
in the United States or exclude her from lawful admission are now characterized as "re-
moval proceedings." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). For the majority of our history, howev-
er, we recognized that exclusion proceedings (seeking to prevent lawful admission) and
deportation proceeding (seeking to expel someone lawfully admitted) were two distinct
animals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (repealed 1996). I utilize this distinction in the Article
because, as discussed infra Part IV, I suspect that the Court's discussion of the nature of
removal proceedings at issue in Padilla was significantly affected by the fact that the pro-
ceedings sought to expel a person previously admitted by the United States as a lawful
permanent resident. Accordingly, I restrict my discussion to deportation proceedings be-
cause I believe the line between deportation and exclusion proceedings was, properly,
critical to the Court's analysis. That is to say, I think the Court may have conceived of the
nature of the removal quite differently if it involved a noncitizen apprehended at the
border who had no prior contact with the United States. See Markowitz, supra note 7, at
329 ("The application of the modern test provides compelling support for the bifurcated
approach: exclusion is civil and expulsion is criminal.").
32 See discussion infra notes 83-99. See generally Legomsky, supra note 28, at 469 (positing
that immigration law's absorption of criminal justice norms "has produced a deportation
regime so substantively harsh and inflexible that too often the penalties are cruelly dis-
proportionate to the transgressions"); Juliet Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT'G
REP. 264, 264 (2006) ("Using removal as a baseline penalty robs the law of any capacity
for adjustment to fit the seriousness of the immigration violation or its consequences for
the individual and others.").
33 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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bias against the relevant class of respondents and the liberty interest
at stake are analogous to those factors in criminal proceedings. Final-
ly, careful consideration of the practical ways in which the individual
right operates in deportation proceedings will be necessary to deter-
mine the scope of the right to be applied, which may well differ from
the scope of the right in pure criminal proceedings.
The article will proceed in four parts: (i) a brief review of pre-
Padilla jurisprudence regarding the nature of deportation proceed-
ings; (ii) an in-depth analysis of the Padilla case itself; (iii) an explora-
tion of the long-term impact of Padilla and why it should be unders-
tood as a potentially critical pivot point in immigration
jurisprudence; and (iv) an articulation of a framework by which
courts could make principled determinations regarding the nature
and scope of respondents' rights under Padilla's conception of de-
portation. I hasten to emphasize that I do not endeavor, in this
piece, to defend or critique the Court's characterization of deporta-
tion-just to describe it, help to understand its import, and aide the
Court's forthcoming jurisprudence. I have previously laid out my
own judgment that deportation straddles the civil-criminal divide,
which comports in large part, but not fully, with the evolving concep-
tion of deportation I see foreshadowed in the Padilla decision.'
I. PRE-PADILLAJURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE NATURE OF
DEPORTATION
A. The Origin of the Civil Label
The origin of the civil label and the historic treatment of deporta-
tion's precursors have been meticulously detailed elsewhere by myself
and others." A brief review is, however, necessary to place the Padilla
decision in context. At the time of the framing of the Constitution,
there was no animal known as "deportation" in American law. The
earliest precursor to modern deportation was banishment, which
dates back to ancient times and was widely used as a form of criminal
punishment for citizens and noncitizens alike. In common law Eng-
land, the government unquestionably possessed the power to both
34 Markowitz, supra note 7.
35 See generally Bleichmar, supra note 28; Cleveland, supra note 25, at 253; Markowitz, supra
note 7.
36 William Garth Snider, Banishment: The Histoiy of Its Use and a Prolosal for Its Abolition Under
the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 459-61 (1998)
(citing examples of banishment as a criminal punishment in various societies dating back
to 2285 B.C.).
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exclude and expel noncitizens.' Legal historians agree that the for-
mer power, to exclude or prevent entry, could be exercised by the
38king alone without any criminal process. In regard to the power to
expel noncitizens from within England, there is some disagreement,
as a theoretical matter, as to whether the power could be exercised
through civil administrative fiat or solely through the criminal
process. As a practical matter, however, the historical record de-
monstrates that expulsion was exercised exclusively as a common
form of criminal punishment in England (imposed on both citizens
and noncitizens) as early as the thirteenth century.0 Such criminal
expulsions first took the form of "abjuration of the realm"4 ' and later
as "transportation,"42 primarily to the American colonies.
Similarly, the American colonies never utilized any civil method to
expel noncitizens and the only method by which citizens or nonciti-
zens were removed from the colonies was through the criminal pu-
nishment of banishment. Accordingly, the dominant historical mod-
els-common law England and the American colonies-which likely
shaped the framers' view of deportation, were exclusively and expli-
37 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 320-22.
38 1 WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259-60 ("[Foreigners] are under the king's
protection; though liable to be sent home whenever the king sees occasion.").
39 See id.; W. F. Craies, 7Te Right of Aliens to Enter British Tenitory, 6 L. Q. REV. 27, 35 (1890)
("England was a complete asylum to the foreigner who did not offend against its
laws. . . ."); On the Alien Bill, 42 EDINBURGH REv. 99, 100, 114 (1825) (arguing that "ex-
pulsion" is a "punishment on conviction in a court ofjustice, for certain offenses, where a
natural-born subject might be left to work out his penalty at home" and that the "pu-
nishment" must be subject to the "severe and odious necessity of criminal law"). Notably,
the text of the Magna Carta itself provides some support for this view insofar as it guaran-
tees that "No Freeman [s]hall be ... exiled, . .. but by the lawful judgment of his peers,
or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39 (1215), reninted in A HISTORY AND
DEFENCE OF MAGNA CHARTA (1769).
40 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 322.
41 Abjuration of the realm, a type of banishment whereby a criminal defendant could escape
prosecution by seeking the assistance of clergy, confessing, and promising to voluntarily
leave the realm and not return upon pain of death, became a common form of criminal
punishment in England as early as the thirteenth century. See William F. Craies, The Com-
pulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. REv. 388, 390, 393-96 (1890); see also Snider,
supra note 36, at 461 (explaining the widespread use of abjuration in England between
the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries).
42 Transportation was a form of criminal punishment whereby convicts would be sentenced
to indentured servitude in or banished to the colonies. Between 1718 and the end of
transportation to the Americas in 1775, one quarter of all British immigrants to America,
or approximately fifty thousand people, were sent as a result of being sentenced to trans-
portation as punishment for a crime. The prevalence of this phenomenon was not lost
on the colonists, who grew increasingly displeased with the practice. In 1775, with the
outbreak of the American Revolution, transportation to America came to an abrupt halt.
See Bleichmar, supra note 28, at 124-29 (detailing the history of the transportation system
and the Transportation Act of 1718).
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citly criminal in nature. For the first century after the founding of
the United States, the regulation of immigration was largely left to
the states. During this period as well, deportation was utilized only
as punishment for serious crimes.
Throughout the majority of the nineteenth century the source
and nature of the federal government's authority to regulate immi-
gration was the source of much debate. 45 The Supreme Court's first
significant discussion of the nature of the power did not come until
1889 in its decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, commonly
known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.46 The case has, in time, come
to symbolize one of the worst episodes in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, alongside cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford7 and Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 4 because of the explicit racism and xenophobia exhibited in the
decision.4 However, the characterization of the immigration power
announced in Chae Chan Ping still forms the basis of the modern
43 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century qf Amencan Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993) (reviewing the state immigration laws during this period); see
also EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965, at 389, 396-404 (1981). One notable exception was the Alien Act of 1798,
which purported to grant the President the power to expel noncitizens without criminal
process. See Cleveland, sufra note 25, at 87-98 (discussing the Alien Act and controversy
surrounding the power that it granted). This power, however, expired two years later and
was never exercised. Moreover, contemporary and modern commentators alike widely
agree that this aspect of the Act was unconstitutional. See id. at 98 (quoting then-Vice
President John C. Calhoun in 1832 as "assert[ing] that the unconstitutionality of the
[Act] was 'settled'"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 750 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the short-lived Act was "the subject of universal condemnation");
see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 53-60 (1996) (discussing the debate); MatthewJ. Lindsay, Immi-
gration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 32 n.146 (2010). But see Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitu-
tion: The First Deportation Law, 10 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 63, 79-83 (2002) (arguing
that the Act was a "proper implementation of congressional war power").
44 Neuman, supra note 43, at 1841, 1844.
45 Earlier immigration cases arose as challenges to state attempts to regulate immigration,
and, in those cases, the Court located the federal power over immigration as derived
principally from the Foreign Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580
(1884); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259 (1875); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849). See generally Cleveland, supra at
note 25, at 106-12, 123-34 (noting the ascendancy of the Commerce Clause in federal
courts' acknowledgement of immigration as an exclusive federal power).
46 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
47 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
48 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
49 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (characterizing Chinese immigration as "for-
eign ... encroachment" through "vast hordes of [the foreign nation's] people crowding
in upon us"); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer,J.,
dissenting) (referring to "the obnoxious Chinese").
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Court's conception of the nature of deportation-or at least its pre-
Padilla conception. Chae Chan Ping was not a deportation case, but
rather a case about the power of the United States to exclude or pre-
vent the entry of foreign nationals. It was in this context that the Su-
preme Court first articulated the "inherent powers theory" in the
immigration realm, which dictates that the immigration power is de-
rived not from any particular constitutional provision but is instead a
power incident to the nature of sovereignty and thus not subject to
the Constitution's limits relevant to criminal proceedings.o It was not
at all clear from Chae Chan Ping whether this conception of the immi-
gration power also applied to deportation of noncitizens already
present in the United States."
However, in 1893, the Court's decision in Fong Yue Ting, for the
first time explicitly applied the inherent powers theory and the civil
label to the deportation context. 2 Fong Yue Ting involved three Chi-
nese nationals who challenged the constitutionality of the statutes
under which they were ordered to be deported because, they
claimed, the statutes subjected them to the criminal punishment of
deportation without affording them the applicable constitutional
protection. The Court held that the power to expel and the power to
exclude were "in truth but parts of one and the same power"53 and
thus the power to deport was also inherent in the nature of sove-
reignty and the criminal constitutional protections, including the
"right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and cruel and unusual punishments, ha[d] no application."
50 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. The Court did not explicitly characterize the exclu-
sion proceedings as civil but its refusal to even address the criminal procedure claim is
strong evidence that it conceived of exclusion as a civil proceeding. The criminal consti-
tutional rights at issue in Chae Chan Ping was the prohibition against ex post facto law.
Chae Chan Ping had left the United States with a valid reentry permit and, while in tran-
sit to return, Congress passed a new act purporting to annul the reentry permits of Chi-
nese nationals.
51 Indeed in the years immediately following Chae Chan Ping the Court issued several deci-
sions which suggested that its analysis may apply only to exclusion and not expulsion cas-
es. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (characterizing Con-
gress's immigration power as pertaining to "[t]he supervision of the admission of aliens
into the United States" and stating that it is a "maxim of international law that every sove-
reign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation,
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe"); Lau Ow Bew v. United
States, 144 U.S. 47, 62 (1892) (suggesting a limitation on Congress's power to regulate
persons already admitted to the United States as permanent residents).
52 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
53 Id. at 713.
54 Id. at 730.
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However, unlike Chae Chan Ping, which had been unanimous, Fong
Yue Ting divided the Court with three justices, including Justice Field,
the author of Chae Chan Ping, dissenting. The dissents argued that
the majority failed to appreciate the historically distinct status of de-
nizens, the precursors to modern permanent residents," and the his-
toric distinctions between the power to exclude, which was civil, and
the power to expel, which was criminal." In the hundred-plus years
between Fong Yue Ting and Padilla, the Court repeatedly reaffirmed,
or at minimum relied upon, the holding that deportation is civil, and,
while it at times displayed some discomfort with application of the la-
bel, it never once substantively reexamined the civil or criminal na-
ture of deportation.
B. The Demise of the Inherent Powers Theory-The Rationale Behind the
Civil Label Is Abandoned but the Holding Remains
In the mid-twentieth century in two cases,5 the Court re-examined
the "inherent powers theory," which underlied the civil label and re-
soundingly repudiated it.59 First in Reid v. Covert, the Court held that
"[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accor-
55 Id. at 736-38 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 755-57 (Field, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra notes 36-44 and accompany-
ing text.
57 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (calling the civil designation
of deportation "debatable" but refusing to reconsider this settled aspect of law); Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (displaying discomfort with the civil label by
noting that expulsion is a "drastic measure"); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391
(1947) (referring to the "high and momentous" stakes in expulsion proceedings);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (characterizing the impact of an expulsion
order as a "great hardship"); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912) (rely-
ing in part on the civil label to permit the retroactive application of a law providing for
the cancellation of fraudulently obtained naturalization certificates); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546-47 (1895) (relying in part on the civil label to uphold ju-
risdiction-stripping provisions that insulated executive action in the immigration arena
from judicial review).
58 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
59 See generally Cleveland, supra note 25, at 131 (discussing the inherent powers doctrine as
"a source of authority inherent in international law and sovereignty"); Markowitz, supra
note 7, at 309-20 (discussing the inherent powers theory, from which the power to ex-
clude or expel citizens is derived). In time, the inherent powers theory has come to be
associated most directly with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). While Curtiss-Wright continues to be cited approvingly
regarding the deference courts owe in foreign affairs, there is no good Supreme Court
case law relying upon the inherent powers holding in Curtiss-Wight.
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dance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."o In
Afroyim v. Rusk, a case involving the power of Congress to expatriate
citizens who vote in foreign elections, the Court drove the point
home further by emphatically explaining that the United States does
not have
any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's
citizenship without his assent. This power cannot. . . be sustained as an
implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations. Other nations
are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no sup-
port from theirs.... Our Constitution governs us and we must never for-
get that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifi-
cally granted or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the
61
specifically granted ones.
Notwithstanding the Court's repudiation of the rationale behind
the civil label, it continued to apply the label after Reid and Afroyim.62
Moreover, the Court never expressed any alternative rationale for the
civil label and thus, after rejecting the inherent powers theory, has
left the civil designation of deportation without any articulated justi-
fication. 3
60 354 U.S. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). The Reid Court held that court-
martial jurisdiction could not be constitutionally applied to trial of civilian dependents of
members of the armed forces overseas in times of peace, for capital offenses. While the
decision in Rezd was a four-vote plurality opinion, Justice Harlan filed a separate concur-
ring opinion adding a fifth vote rejecting the inherent powers theory. Id. at 66 (HarlanJ.
concurring) ("The powers of Congress, unlike those of the English Parliament, are con-
stitutionally circumscribed. Under the Constitution[,] Congress has only such powers as
are expressly granted or those that are implied as reasonably necessary and proper to car-
ry out the granted powers.").
61 Afrcyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998) (noting that the "risk that [a res-
ident alien's] testimony might subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for
asserting [the Fifth Amendment] privilege [against self-incrimination], given the civil
character of a deportation proceeding"); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038
(1984) (describing deportation proceedings as "purely civil" actions); United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923) ("And since deportation proceedings are in
their nature civil, the rule excluding involuntary confessions could have no applica-
tion."); Conteh v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining "the invitation to
transplant the categorical approach root and branch-without any modification whatev-
er-into the civil removal context").
63 The inherent powers theory has reared its head again, at least in name, in the context of
recent Bush administration robust articulations of the President's power in war and na-
tional security matters. See generally Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Execu-
tive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569, 588 (2010) (characterizing the Bush position as a
sloppy mixture of the unitary and inherent power models); Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Ex-
ecutive Power: A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2484-85 (2006) (recognizing
that modern scholars advance various permutations of the inherent powers theory and
describing the Bush administration's internal memos as "[t]he most recent executive
branch defense of the inherent power theory"). However, these recent resurrections of
the inherent powers rhetoric are, in fact, of an entirely different nature than the theory
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C. Doctrinal Incoherence-The Civil Label's Tension with Application of
Criminal Doctrine
While the Court, even in Padilla, continues to utilize the civil label
to describe deportation proceedings, increasingly that label is in ten-
sion with the application of criminal, or quasi-criminal, doctrine in
deportation proceedings. Much has been written in recent years
about the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms in de-
portation proceedings. The majority of this writing has focused on
articulated in Fong Yue Tung and Chae Chan Ping and rejected in Reid and Afroyim. In this
context the executive branch has attempted to develop a broad theory of the powers in-
herent in the Article II explicit grants of power to the President. See, e.g., Brief for Peti-
tioner at 14, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) ("First, the Presi-
dent's inherent powers as Commander in Chief are substantially more robust than
recognized by the court of appeals."); Memorandum fromJay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Part V, 31-39 (Aug. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation
memo20020801.pdf (arguing that any statute that would interfere with the President's
ability to interrogate enemy combatants would impermissibly encroach on the President's
Commander-in-Chief powers and would therefore be unconstitutional); Memorandum
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the President (Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (grounding an assertion that
the President enjoys unenumerated executive powers in the Vesting Clause, stating that
"the enumeration in Article II marks the points at which several traditional executive
powers were diluted or reallocated. Any other, unenumerated executive powers, however,
were conveyed to the President by the Vesting Clause" (emphasis in original)). With the
arguable exception of one sentence in one brief, the Bush administration's inherent
powers claims did not involve claims of powers inherent in the nature of sovereignty de-
rived from some extra-constitutional source. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1395) ("The government's ability to carry out [intelligence]
operations is essential to national security and is an inherent attribute of national sove-
reignty."). Critically, even the more limited articulation of the inherent powers theory
has been rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
("[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President .... [And the Constitution] most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").
Moreover, the Obama administration has largely abandoned reliance on the Bush admin-
istration's inherent powers theory. See Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Gov-
ernment's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, 3-8,
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 08-
442) (arguing the administration's detention authority based on the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force); see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 17-18, Al-Marri
v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (No. 08-368) (relying on statutory authority for deten-
tion).
64 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-
tion of Fourth And Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010) (exploring the proce-
dural deficiencies of the current system and offering proposals to address the problem);
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 ColUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135
(2009) (attempting to theorize criminal prosecutions of offenses related to migration);
Legomsky, supra note 28, at 255 (concluding that the Court should not give special defe-
rence to Congress in immigration cases); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocu-
mented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
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the incorporation of what Professor Legomsky calls criminal "en-
forcement norms" into deportation proceedings in contrast to the
lack of any corresponding incorporation of criminal "adjudication
norms.""6 The criminal enforcement norms that have come to domi-
nate immigration law include the increased criminalization of immi-
gration violations, the increased immigration consequences of even
minor criminal violations, the use of preventative detention, and the
increased role of traditional criminal justice actors, such as local po-
lice, in immigration enforcement.6 6 In contrast, the criminal adjudi-
catory norms that have yet to be incorporated into deportation pro-
ceedings include basic procedural protections such as the right to
appointed counsel,67 the prohibition on ex post facto laws,68 protections
REG. 639, 640 (2004) ("[W] ell-accepted historical matrices are increasingly inadequate to
address the complex issues raised by various U.S. government practices in the so-called
'war on terrorism."'); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83-86 (2005) (tracing the
relationship between criminal punishment and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citi-
zenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEo. IMMIGR. Ll.
611, 616-20 (2003) (describing the criminalization of immigration law); Pauw, supra note
28, at 307 (noting that constitutional safeguards that traditionally apply in the context of
criminal prosecution should apply alike in immigration cases); Pinzon, supra note 28; Di-
nesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You're Out! The Crumbling Distinction
Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century, 35 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 135, 148-51 (2008) (explaining that "criminal proceedings are undertaken with
the desired immigration outcome in mind");Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Im-
migrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 376 (2006) ("The merger of
[criminal law and immigration law] in both substance and procedure has created parallel
systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice system are merely nominally
separate."); see also Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Con-
stitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 18-19 (1990) (discussing the oddity of the lack of consti-
tutional protections afforded to noncitizens in deportation proceedings in contrast to the
rather robust constitutional protections afforded to noncitizens in other realms, such as
criminal proceedings).
65 See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 473-75.
66 Id. at 482-86 (discussing increased immigration consequences of crimes); Stumpf, supra
note 64, at 386 ("Between 1908 and 1980, there were approximately 56,000 immigrants
deported based on criminal convictions. In 2004 alone, there were more than 88,000
such deportations."); id. at 378 (tracing the convergence of criminal and immigration
law, in which "[i]mmigration violations previously handled as civil matters are increasing-
ly addressed as criminal offenses").
67 Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Because immigration proceed-
ings are of a civil rather than criminal nature, aliens in removal proceedings 'enjoy[ ] no
specific right to counsel' under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution." (quoting jian
Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005))); Lopez-Vega v. Hold-
er, 336 F. App'x 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e have never extended a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to immigration proceedings."); Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461,
464 (8th Cir. 2004) ("It is well-settled that, while there is no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, aliens have a statutory right to counsel at their own expense . . . ." (citation omit-
ted)); Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no Sixth
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against double jeopardy," and the right to trial by jury.o This asym-
metry has contributed to what Professor Stumpf aptly dubbed the
"crimmigration crisis. 7 1
Amendment right to counsel in deportation hearings... ."); Mustata v. U.S. Dept. of jus-
tice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is clear that the Sixth Amendment
does not apply to civil deportation proceedings."); Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142,
144 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Deportation hearings are deemed civil proceedings and thus aliens
have no constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment."); Lozada v. INS,
857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Because deportation proceedings are deemed to be civil,
rather than criminal, in nature, petitioners have no constitutional right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.").
68 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (holding that retroactive application of
new grounds for deportation did not violate the ex post facto clause); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ("[1It has been the unbroken rule of this Court that [the ex post facto
clause] has no application to deportation."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
594-96 (1952) (stating that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws does not
apply to laws affecting deportation); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (stat-
ing that "[t]he prohibition of ex post facto laws in Article I, § 9, has no application" to de-
portation); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 722-24 (1893) (rejecting an ar-
gument that a law that subjected a Chinese citizen to removal retroactively was
unconstitutional as an ex post facto law); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 2002)
(stating that an argument derived from the Ex Post Facto Clause is not available to peti-
tioner "because deportation statutes are civil in nature"); United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d
831, 834 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A long and unwavering line of authority has established that sta-
tutes retroactively setting criteria for deportation do not violate the ex post facto provi-
sion."); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The ex post facto clause
has been unswervingly held as inapplicable to matters of deportation."); Artukovic v. INS,
693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder does not apply to deportation statutes.").
69 United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Because deportation proceed-
ings are civil and not criminal in nature, they cannot form the basis for a double jeopardy
claim .... ); accord Figuereo-Sanchez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 382 F. App'x 211, 213 (3d Cir.
2010) ("To the extent that Figuereo-Sanchez is claiming a violation of double jeopardy by
arguing that he is being punished twice for his criminal offense, his claim lacks merit be-
cause a deportation proceeding is a purely civil action and the purpose of deporation is
not to punish past transgressions." (internal quotations marks omitted)); United States v.
Danson, 115 F. App'x 486, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) ("It is settled law that deporation is a civil
proceeding and is not considered a criminal punishment, regardless of its harsh conse-
quences."); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the double jeopardy clause applies only to proceedings that are criminal in nature);
Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying petitioner's double jeopardy ar-
gument due to the classification of deportation as a civil procedure).
70 Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (explaining that proceedings to enforce im-
migration regulations are not criminal prosecutions and therefore "may be properly de-
volved upon an executive department or subordinate officials thereof, and that the find-
ings of fact reached by such officials, after a fair though summary hearing, may
constitutionally be made conclusive, as they are made by the provisions of the act in ques-
tion"); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904) (finding that the
constitutional right of trial byjury has no application to deportation); Fong Yue Ting, 149
U.S. at 730 (same).
71 Stumpf, supra note 64, at 377.
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While this asymmetry and evidence of the paltry level of justice af-
forded to respondents in deportation proceedings is disturbing, it is
not necessarily a marker of doctrinal incoherence. That is to say, in
theory, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent about a civil regime
which shares some attributes with the criminal process but which
does not trigger the Constitution's criminal procedural protections."
In fact, the incoherence comes from exactly the opposite phenome-
non: courts' adherence to the civil label and simultaneous applica-
tion of distinctly and uniquely criminal procedural norms. While the
literature has tended to focus on the criminal rights that have not
been applied to deportation proceedings-and many of the most crit-
ical rights have not 7 3-it is in some ways more surprising to observe
the many criminal doctrinal strands that have taken root in purpor-
tedly civil deportation proceedings. The doctrinal spheres where this
can be seen most clearly are: the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel, the rule of lenity, the void for vagueness doctrine and the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule. To be clear, and as discussed below,
72 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 472 ("[Tlhe courts have uniformly insisted that deportation
is not punishment and that, therefore, the criminal procedural safeguards do not apply
in deportation proceedings. Those and similar principles remain untouched by the gra-
dual importation of criminal justice norms into immigration law. As a result, the criminal
justice model has had no discernible benefits for immigrants.").
73 See id., at 499-500, 515-16 (listing the rights afforded to criminal defendants that have
been rejected to individuals facing deportation proceedings, including double jeopardy,
Miranda warnings, the privilege against self-incrimination, trial by jury, restrictions on
bills of attainder, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, the Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and the bar on hearsay evidence); discussion supra notes 67-
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923) (noting that
involuntary confessions are admissible at deportation hearing); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
730 (stating that the Eight Amendment does not restrict deportation because it is not
punishment); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Bustos-Torres
v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize the right to con-
front an accuser and bar hearsay evidence at a deportation hearing and stating generally
that the Federal Rules of Evidence have no application); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024,
1029-30 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding mandatory deportation of Nazi war criminals because
deportation does not fall into the category of legislative punishment, a prerequisite for
finding a bill of attainder); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at government expense in
deportation proceedings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (allow-
ing admission of statements made without Miranda warnings); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525
F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Oliver, 517 F.2d at 428 (refusing to apply double
jeopardy to a civil deportation proceeding and finding that the Eighth Amendment does
not restrict deportation because it is not punishment); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397,
399-401 (7th Cir. 1975) (allowing admission of statements made without Miranda warn-
ings); United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at government expense in deportation proceed-
ings); Burquez v. INS, 513 F.2d 751, 755 (10th Cir. 1975) (same).
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not all of these areas of law operate in precisely the same way in de-
portation proceedings as they do in criminal proceedings. Indeed, in
some instances, courts go through significant jurisprudential gymnas-
tics to make them apply at all, but this is precisely the point. The way
courts twist themselves in knots, using legal fiction heaped upon legal
fiction, to make the criminal square pegs fit in the civil round holes is
the best evidence of the doctrinal incoherence that currently exists in
courts' treatment of the nature of deportation proceedings.
The right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceed-
ings is, of course, derived from the Sixth Amendment's explicit pro-
scription. Since the Sixth Amendment is applicable only to criminal
proceedings, it generally follows that there is no right to effective
counsel in civil proceedings. As we would expect, the civil label of
deportation proceedings has led courts to generally reject claims that
respondents are entitled to appointed counsel in deportation pro-
ceedings." However, counterintuitively, the Attorney General, the
74 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions," a defendant shall
have the right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 166 (2002) ("[A]ssistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness [in a criminal
trial] does not meet the constitutional mandate [of the Sixth Amendment] ... ." (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984))).
75 Absent a governmental obligation to supply counsel in civil cases, a client is bound by the
actions of his or her attorney. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1985)
(holding that a taxpayer was not excused from filing late by reasonable reliance on the at-
torney handling the tax matter); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (find-
ing "no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's [negligence] claim because
of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client"); Watson v.
Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) ("There is no constitutional or statutory right for
an indigent to have counsel appointed in a civil case [alleging violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment against police officers]. It of course follows there is no constitutional
or statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case."(internal citation omit-
ted)).
76 See, e.g., Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469-70 (holding no Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel at government expense in deportation proceedings); Gasca-Kraft, 522
F.2d at 152 (same); Burquez, 513 F.2d at 755 (same). By statute, noncitizens in deporta-
tion proceedings do have the right to be represented by counsel, but not at the expense
of the government. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b) (4) (A), 1362 (2006). However, at least one
Court of Appeals has recognized at least a potential, though as of yet still theoretical,
right to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings under the due process clause.
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568-69 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that "[w] here
an unrepresented indigent would require counsel to present his position adequately to
an immigration judge, he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government's expense.
Otherwise 'fundamental fairness' would be violated" and adopting a case-by-case ap-
proach to the issue of government-funded counsel); see also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102,
103, 108 n.I1 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that lack of representation may support a finding
that the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") abused its discretion in deporting an
alien); United States v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ("Informing a
prisoner with total resources of $30.00, a stranger in a strange land with a complete lack
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Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and the majority of circuits
have recognized a right to effective assistance of counsel in deporta-
tion proceedings" and have frequently reversed deportation orders
or granted motions to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assis-
tance." The right to effective assistance in "civil" deportation pro-
ceedings is couched in the rhetoric of the due process clause: "Inef-
fective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of
due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that
of knowledge of the language of that country, that he had the right to counsel is almost
an empty gesture."). See generally Irving A. Appleman, Right to Counsel in Deportation Pro-
ceedings, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 130, 132 (1976); Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deporta-
tion-Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 289, 290 (1975), available at
http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/VolO8/DavisVol08 Black.pdf; Jean Pierre Espi-
noza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings: Matter of Compean and the
Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA.J. INT'L L. 65, 73-74 (2010); Charles Gordon, Right to
Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 875, 883 (1961); William Haney, Depor-
tation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 177 (1970); Pauw, supra note 28, at 340;
Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representationfor Detained Aliens: Litigation and Admin-
istrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1660-63 (1997); David A. Robertson, An Opportu-
nity to Be Heard: The Right to Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019
(1988).
77 See, e.g., Fadiga v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings); Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857,
863-64 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Dakane v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.
2004) (same); Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Sa-
akian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); Saleh v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 962
F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1-3
(2009) (same); In re Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. 637, 637-40 (1988), affd 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st
Cir. 1988); see also In re Bassel Nabih Assaad, 23 1. & N. Dec. 553, 558 (2003) ("[Slince [In
re] Lozada was decided 15 years ago, the circuit courts have consistently continued to rec-
ognize that despite having no right to appointed counsel in an immigration hearing, a re-
spondent has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and
may be denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from meaningfully present-
ing his or her case."). But see Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798-99 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding that any ineffectiveness of privately retained counsel cannot be imputed to the
government to establish a Fifth Amendment violation); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853,
861 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[T]here is no constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to
effective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding. Removal proceedings are civil;
there is no constitutional right to an attorney, so an alien cannot claim constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent Rafliyev's counsel was ineffective, the fed-
eral government was not accountable for her substandard performance; it is imputed to
the client." (citations omitted)).
78 See, e.g., Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 2008) (granting petition for review
based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 144-45 (same); Sanchez v.
Keisler, 505 F.3d 641, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 163
(5th Cir. 2006) (same); Osei v. INS, 305 F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); Sa-
akian, 252 F.3d at 23 (same); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 2000)
(same); In re N-K- & V-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 879, 881-82 (1997) (granting motion to reopen
based on claim of ineffective assistance); In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 1. & N. Dec. 472, 473-
74 (1996) (finding that ineffective assistance of counsel may amount to "exceptional cir-
cumstances" in the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order).
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the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case." 9 How-
ever, in practice, it functions similarly to the facially lower standard of
"reasonable performance" required under the Sixth Amendment."o
The oddity of a right to effective assistance, without the correspond-
ing right to any assistance at all, is perhaps the clearest example of
doctrinal incoherence in the courts' treatment of the nature of re-
moval proceedings.
The Court's application of the traditionally criminal void for va-
gueness and rule of lenity doctrines to "civil" deportation proceed-
ings are additional examples of doctrinal incoherence. Under the
void for vagueness doctrine, a penal statute must be written with suf-
ficient definiteness as to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden.8 ' As the D.C.
Circuit has explained:
In the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity
in draftsmanship than in civil contexts, commensurate with the bedrock
principle that in a free country citizens who are potentially subject to
criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may
82
cause sanctions to be visited upon them.
However, in Jordan v. De George, the Supreme Court applied the crim-
inal vagueness doctrine to examine the constitutionality of a deporta-
79 In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.
80 Accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) ("[A] defendant must overcome the pre-
sumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy." (internal quotations omitted)); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 381-82 (1986) (discussing the strong presumption of reasonableness of counsel's
performance required by Sirickland and noting that, "Strickland's standard, although by no
means insurmountable, is highly demanding"); cf Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984) ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferen-
tial.... [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must over-
come the presumption that, tinder the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 690 ("[Tjhe
court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate as-
sistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.").
81 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-46 (1971) (holding that an ordinance that
gave insufficient notice to the average person of what constituted a violation was void);
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."); Boyce Mo-
tor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340 (1952) ("A criminal statute must be suffi-
ciently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its
penalties . .. ."); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be re-
quired at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
82 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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tion statute for persons convicted of "crime[s] involving moral turpi-
tude."8 3 The Court explicitly recognized the incongruence of apply-
ing the criminal doctrine to these civil proceedings but explained
that "[d]iespite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nev-
ertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine to this
case" because of the "grave nature of deportation." Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague."
Recently in Arnaga v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit explained that the
"void for vagueness' doctrine is chiefly applied to criminal legisla-
tion. Laws with civil consequences receive less exacting vagueness
scrutiny" but that the Supreme Court assessed the deportation provi-
sion "as if it imposed a criminal penalty.""
Similarly, in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan," the Court applied the "rule
of lenity"-commonly, though not exclusively,8 associated with crim-
inal proceedings-to deportation proceedings. The case required
the Court to interpret the meaning of a statutory provision that pro-
vided for the deportation of individuals who had been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude "more than once.""9 The Court
again reasoned that "deportation is a drastic measure and at times
the equivalent of banishment or exile" and held that "since the stakes
are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress
meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."90 Since
Phelan, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the principle that
courts should construe ambiguous immigration statutes favorably to
noncitizens.9'
83 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951).
84 Id. at 231.
85 Id. at 232; see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1967).
86 521 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2008).
87 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
88 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (applying rule of leni-
ty to cases involving Native Americans) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commr'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (same).
89 Fong Haew Tan, 333 U.S at 7.
90 Id. at 10. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper
Place: A Tool ofLast Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 479, 491-92 (2007) (describing
the "immigration rule of lenity"); Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and
Immigration Law, 34 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 363, 372-73 (2007) (stating that the rule of lenity
was "[diesigned by the Court to protect a vulnerable minority").
91 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (analyzing the rule of lenity alongside the
general "presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions"
to determine that Congress had not fully considered the costs and benefits of applying a
statute to pre-enactment convictions); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court's decisions directing courts to apply the rule
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The increasingly frequent application of the criminal exclusionary
rule is yet another example of the courts importing uniquely criminal
doctrine into purportedly civil deportation proceedings. The famili-
ar rule in a criminal proceeding is that evidence obtained as a result
of an unlawful search or seizure will be suppressed if the link between
the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. In
contrast, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
admissible in civil proceedings.93  In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme
Court specifically considered whether the exclusionary rule should
operate in deportation proceedings. 94  In a 5-4 opinion written by
Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
does not ordinarily apply to "civil deportation hearing [s] . Howev-
of lenity in the immigration context); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)
(noting the "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deporta-
tion statutes in favor of the alien"); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (weighing the
humanitarian values of keeping families together with the statutory language at issue to
determine that the statute should be read in favor of the alien); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S.
120, 128-29 (1964) (determining that under § 241 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Natio-
nality Act, an alien who committed crimes while a naturalized citizen could not be de-
ported after being denaturalized); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958) ("When
Congress leaves to the judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 596-97 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the rule of lenity in
reaching a favorable statutory interpretation for the noncitizen); Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d
1161, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 543 (6th Cir.
2003) (acknowledging the presumption of favoring an alien when a statutory clause is
ambiguous, but concluding that the clause in question was not ambiguous); Jobson v.
Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 376 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the immigration rule of lenity re-
quires the narrowest meaning that may be adopted); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034,
1043 (4th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the presumption of leniency but ruling against the
noncitizen). See generally Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Defe-
rence, 17 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 520-23 (2003) (describing the Supreme Court's creation
of the immigration rule of lenity and its broad application in lower courts); cf In re Haru-
tunian, 14 1. & N. Dec. 583, 588-89 (1974) (holding that the rule of lenity does not apply
to statutory provisions applicable to exclusion).
92 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) (citing Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963)) (referring to the rule); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(holding that the exclusion rule applies in criminal prosecutions in state courts as well as
federal courts).
93 See United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) ("[T]he Court never has applied [the
exclusionary rule] to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."). How-
ever, there is case law demonstrating that, in fact, the exclusionary rule was previously
employed in removal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (1980)
(terminating proceedings where the government's sole evidence supporting removability
was suppressed).
94 l4ez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034.
95 Id. But see Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in
the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L.
REv 1109, 1116-22, 1140-46 (2008) (arguing that the purely civil nature of deportation
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er, the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule may be available if
the Fourth Amendment violations by immigration authorities are
"widespread" or "egregious."06  Since Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA and cir-
cuit courts have expanded on Justice O'Connor's egregiousness stan-
dard, opening the door to application of the exclusionary rule in de-
portation proceedings." And indeed, suppression motions, while still
the exception, are becoming an increasingly frequent feature of de-
portation proceedings." Again, the purported burden on respon-
proceedings was an underpinning of Justice O'Connor's opinion and that the corrosion
of the understanding of deportation proceedings as civil in recent years warrants a recon-
sideration of Lopez-Mendoza).
96 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.
97 See United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 227 n.1, 228-30 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding
suppression of evidence related to the defendant's identity to be appropriate on other
grounds); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234-36 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the
egregiousness standard in a deportation hearing but finding no violation); United States
v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that suppression of a defendant's
immigration file in a prosecution for illegal re-entry may be appropriate in cases of egre-
gious Fourth Amendment violations); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104,
1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Lopez-Mendoza does not prevent the suppression
of all identity-related evidence); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.
2004) (considering an argument based on the egregiousness standard in a deportation
hearing but ultimately finding no violation); Miguel v. INS, 359 F.3d 408, 411 & n.3 (6th
Cir. 2004) (declining to reach the applicability of the exclusionary rule because the im-
migration judge did not rely on any of the evidence seized); Martinez-Camargo v. INS,
282 F.3d 487, 492-93 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to reach the issue of egregiousness be-
cause the investigatory stop was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances);
Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 492-93, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that immigration
agents committed egregious violations by seizing Orhorhaghe outside of his apartment
and conducting a warrantless search based on his Nigerian sounding name); In re Velas-
quez, 19 1. & N. Dec. 377, 380 (1986) (affirming a denial of a motion for suppression be-
cause the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings); In re Benitez, 19
I. & N. Dec. 173, 175 (1984) (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule is not applicable
in deportation proceedings and finding the record sufficient to support deportation even
without the contested evidence). But see United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181,
1185-86 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining that Lopez-Mendoza does not control); United
States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2001) (electing not to apply
Lopez-Mendoza); Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1997) (assuming that
in deportation proceedings the exclusionary rule does not exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
98 BESS CHIu, LYNLY EGYEs, PETER L. MARKOWI'r/ &JAYA VASANDANI, CARDOZO IMMIGRATION
JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID
OPERATIONS 14 (2009), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.
aspx?ccmd=ContentEdit&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=84&contentid= I 1652&folderid=224
6 ("Since 2006, there has been a nine-fold increase in the filing of suppression motions, a
twenty-two-fold increase in suppression motions related to home raids, and a five-fold in-
crease in the grant rate of suppression motions."); see also Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Op-
erations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Ra-
ids, 89 N.C. L. REv. 507, 527 (2011) (noting that U.S. courts of appeals have allowed
suppression motions for egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment and advocating
for more suppression).
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dents seeking suppression in "civil" deportation proceedings (egre-
gious violation) is, on its face, higher than the burden on criminal
defendants (mere violation). However, as a practical matter the types
of violations that ultimately result in suppression are frequently not
so dissimilar."9 So, once again, we see a uniquely criminal law doc-
trine creeping into the "civil" deportation realm.'00
99 See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1365, 1375 (2008) (citing studies demonstrating that less than 1.3% of suppression
motions are successful); Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionay
Rule and Deterrence, 75 Mo. L. REv. 459, 470-73 (2010) (explaining that "[e]ven if the po-
lice were to commit egregious misconduct and violate a suspect's constitutional rights,
the probability that the evidence would be suppressed (p) is still very low" and that "the
odds are overwhelming that the suppression hearing will be unsuccessful"). See generally
U.S. COMPTROLLEIR GEN., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILIlY OFFICE, GAO B-I 71019, IMPACT OF
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 9-11 (1979) (citing data
reflecting the use and success rate of suppression motions in criminal proceedings);
Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of
the Exclusionary Rule: The NI] Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 611, 660 (1983) (analyzing the GAO study); Peter Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclu-
sionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 585, 596 (1983) (distinguish-
ing success rates for motions to suppress based on the type of evidence).
100 There are additional examples of doctrinal drift from criminal law into deportation law.
For example, the Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against self-incrimination in "any
criminal case." Therefore, since deportation proceedings are considered civil, as a tech-
nical matter, immigrants cannot refuse to answer questions simply because the answers
will lead to their deportation. Indeed, when immigrants refuse to answer such questions
the law permits a negative inference to be drawn from their silence. However, as a prac-
tical matter, immigrants are protected in much the same way as criminal defendants be-
cause courts have routinely held that the negative inference from silence is not sufficient
to sustain the government's burden in a deportation proceeding. See generally United
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 692 n.18 (1998) (recognizing that silence cannot be used to
substantiate a deportation claim); Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony
and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 603 (1990) (ex-
plaining that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in deportation pro-
ceedings in spite of their characterization as civil). But see United States ex rel. Bilokumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (explaining that an alien's "failure to claim that he was a
citizen and his refusal to testify" about his citizenship "had a tendency to prove that he
was an alien"). The burden of proof applied is yet another example. In general, the de-
fault standard of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence. See Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 278, 286 (1991). However, the Supreme Court has required an inter-
mediate standard of proof in deportation cases between the civil preponderance standard
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See Woodby
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) ("[I]t is incumbent upon the Government in such pro-
ceedings to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence." (emphasis added)); see aLso Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)
("The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words
'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal,' and 'convincing,' is less commonly used, but nonetheless
'is no stranger to the civil law.' One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The in-
terests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money
and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputa-
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The modern Court, at least until Padilla, has been steadfast in de-
scribing deportation proceedings as "purely civil" actions.o' Indeed,
in many cases where respondents have attempted to assert rights
commonly associated with criminal proceedings, courts have rejected
the claim out of hand, based solely on the civil label without any fur-
ther analysis.12  It is, however, difficult to reconcile these cases with
the contrasting phenomenon of the regular importation of certain
criminal doctrinal strands into this purportedly purely civil realm. In
effect, the current state of the pre-Padilla doctrine was that deporta-
tion is purely and exclusively civil . .. except when it isn't. When we
examine this doctrinal incoherence in the historical context of de-
portation precursors, which were explicitly recognized as criminal
penalties,'" and in light of the Court's repudiation of its only articu-
lated justification for the civil label' 04-the inherent powers theory-
what is revealed is the confused and indefensible state of the current
jurisprudence regarding the nature of deportation.
tion tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof. Similarly, this
Court has used the 'clear, unequivocal and convincing' standard of proof to protect par-
ticularly important individual interests in various civil cases." (citations omitted)); id. at
432 (holding that a standard above preponderance of the evidence is necessary for civil
commitment cases, though the term "unequivocal" is not constitutionally required in that
context); cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings).
101 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
102 See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining "the invitation to trans-
plant the categorical approach root and branch-without any modification whatever-
into the civil removal context"); Csekinek v. INS, 391 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting ex post facto argument because "[t]he Supreme Court has specifically held that
immigration and deportation proceedings are civil, and not criminal, in nature"); Bilo-
kunsky, 263 U.S. at 157 ("And since deportation proceedings are in their nature civil, the
rule excluding involuntary confessions could have no application"); Briseno v. INS, 192
F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[D]eportation is not criminal punishment."); Babys,
524 U.S. at 671 ("[R]isk that [resident alien's] testimony might subject him to deporta-
tion is not a sufficient ground for asserting the privilege, given the civil character of a de-
portation proceeding."); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1991) (relying
on the civil label in rejecting an ex post facto claim); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d
Cir. 1975) ("[P]etitioner's contentions that her deportation constitutes the infliction of
double jeopardy and is a cruel and unusual punishment fail, among other reasons, under
the principle so clear to judges, however difficult it may be for laymen to comprehend,
that deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a
civil rather than a criminal procedure." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Scheide-
mann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1520 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he prohibition against ex postfac-
to laws does not apply to deportation proceedings, which are purely civil . . . ." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
103 See discussion supra notes 36-44 (reviewing the role of deportation at common law and in
the American colonies).
104 See discussion supra Part LB (reviewing the demise of the inherent powers theory).
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II. PADILLA: A CLOSE READING.
It was in the context of this tangled jurisprudence regarding the
nature of deportation that the Court considered the case of Padilla.'05
The central issue in Padilla did not, however, necessarily require any
examination of the civil or criminal nature of deportation proceed-
ings. Padilla was a native of Honduras, an honorably discharged vet-
eran of the United States Army, and had been a lawful permanent
resident of the United States for over forty years by the time his case
reached the Supreme Court.0" In 2001, the tractor trailer Padilla was
driving was stopped by police for a safety inspection, and he, thereaf-
ter, allegedly consented to a search of his vehicle.1o' The search re-
vealed several styrofoam boxes containing approximately 1033
pounds of marijuana.'0" Padilla was charged with, inter alia, traffick-
ing in marijuana and ultimately pled guilty in return for a sentence of
ten years, with five years to be served and five years to be probated.00
However, Padilla alleges that he only pled guilty in reliance upon his
attorney's affirmative misadvice that he "did not have to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long."' 0
In fact, Padilla's conviction was an aggravated felony"' subjecting
him to mandatory detention and deportation."2  In 2004, two years
after his conviction, Padilla filed a pro se post-conviction motion
seeking to withdraw his plea, asserting that he had received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, to wit: being affirmatively misadvised about
the immigration consequences of his plea agreement."3  The trial
court denied the motion but was reversed by the Kentucky Court of
105 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
106 Id. at 1477.
107 Brief of Respondent at 2, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009
WL 2473880.
108 Id. at 3.
109 Id. at 3-4.
110 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
III See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (B) (2006) (defining drug trafficking as an aggravated felony).
112 Conviction of an "aggravated felony," defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2006), includes
a broad range of offenses including drug trafficking crimes, though ironically convictions
need not be either aggravated or felonies to be classified as "aggravated felonies." Aggra-
vated felons are ineligible for "cancellation of removal," the primary form of discretionary
relief available to longtime residents, and therefore noncitizens like Padilla who commit
aggravated felonies are subject to mandatory deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)
(2006) (excluding aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony from a class
whose removal the Attorney General may cancel). Section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) (2006), provides for the mandatory immigration detention of a large class of
noncitizens who are subject to criminal convictions. This includes all aggravated felons
upon their release from criminal custody.
113 Brief of Petitioner at 11, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
1326 [Vol. 13:5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1666788
DEPORTATIONIS DIFFERENT
Appeals.H4 Ultimately, a divided Kentucky Supreme Court held that
since deportation was a collateral, not direct, consequence of the
criminal conviction, even affirmative misadvise did not violate the
Sixth Amendment because "collateral consequences are outside the
scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,"
and therefore it held "that counsel's failure to advise Appellee of
such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly pro-
vides no basis for relief."" 5 The issue before the Supreme Court cen-
tered on the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a tra-
ditional criminal proceeding and thus did not necessarily require
consideration of the criminal or civil nature of deportation proceed-
ings.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably, because of
the division of lower court authority regarding the consequences of a
criminal defense attorney's misadvice or failure to advise a defendant
about the immigration consequences of a contemplated plea agree-
ment. The large majority of courts to consider the issue, including
ten federal circuits and seventeen states, had held that a criminal de-
fense attorney's failure to advise her clients of the immigration con-
sequences of a contemplated plea agreement is not ineffective assis-
tance."'6 Three state courts had held to the contrary that, in at least
114 Id. at 11-12.
115 Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
116 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2008); Yong Wong
Park v. United States, 222 F. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2007); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251,
1257 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d
1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir.
2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Ro-
sario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1989),
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit. V, § 505(b), 104 Stat. 5050, and cer. denied,
493 U.S. 1059 (1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990,
991 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 945 (1973); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Major v.
State, 814 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002); Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1999);
People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1991); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583
(Iowa 1987); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 2002); Commonwealth v. Fuarta-
do, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (La. 2002);
Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 579 (Minn. 1998); State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 224
(Neb. 2002); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 1999); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d
860, 864 (N.D. 1994); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93-94 (Pa. 1989); Niko-
laev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72, 77 (S.D. 2005); State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-12, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651), 2009 WIL 4933628 (discussing the issue of whether or not counsel's nonad-
vice or misadvice about deportation violates the Sixth Amendment).
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some situations, defense attorneys have an affirmative obligation to
advise clients about immigration consequences."' On the issue of af-
firmative misadvice, the great weight of authority went in the oppo-
site direction, with seventeen jurisdictions holding that misadvice
about immigration consequences was ineffective assistance of coun-
sel"" and only one jurisdiction joining Kentucky to hold to the con-
trary."9 The Supreme Court had not commented directly on the is-
sue in the past though it had once suggested in dicta that, in light of
the gravity of the consequence of deportation, defense attorneys
should advise clients about immigration consequences.2
117 See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987) (holding that if a lawyer had enough
information to believe the client was a noncitizen, effective assistance would require ad-
vising about collateral immigration consequences), rev'd on other grounds, 746 P.2d 523
(Colo. 1987) (en banc); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004) (holding that an
attorney must determine the defendant's immigration status and specifically advise the
defendant of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty); see also State v. Creary,
No. 82767, 2004 WL 351878, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004) (explaining that while
defense lawyers ordinarily need not advise clients of collateral consequences including
deportation, "an evolving sense of the lawyer's duty indicates that such information
should be given when it appears critical to the defendant's situation" and finding that a
lawyer's failure to advise a client whom he knew to be interested in deportation conse-
quences can be ineffective); cf Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. App. 1994)
(reaching same result on state constitutional grounds); Gonzalez v. State, 134 P.3d 955,
958-59 (Or. 2006) (same). See generally Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors
et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116, at 12-13 (discussing the "evolving understandings
ofjustice" as reflected by state court decisions that criminal defense lawyers must advise at
least some noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of conviction).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d
1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979); Djioev v.
State, No. A-9158, 2006 WL 361540, at *2-3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006); Alguno v.
State, 892 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796,
799 (Ga. 2004); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ill. 1985); Rubio v. State, 194 P.3d
1224, 1232 (Nev. 2008); State v. Garcia, 727 A.2d 97, 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999);
Creary, 2004 WL 351878, at *2; King v. State, No. M2006-02745-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL
3052854 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2007); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 934-35
(Utah 2005); Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587 (Va.
Cir. Ct. July 26, 2005); Valle v. State, 132 P.3d 181, 184 (Wyo. 2006); see also In re Resendiz,
19 P.3d 1171, 1177 (Cal. 2001) (stating that failing to advise or providing misadvice may
be ineffective); People v. McDonald, 745 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(same), afd 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003).
119 See United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (holding that
the appellant "was not unfairly or unjustly treated" when trial judge refused to allow the
appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty at the time he appeared for sentencing).
120 See lNS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) ("Even if the defendant were not initially
aware of § 212(c), competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice
guides, would have advised him concerning the provision's importance."). See generally
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland standard to plea agree-
ments).
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Before the Supreme Court, Kentucky relied primarily on the ar-
gument that deportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal
conviction and on the great weight of authority holding that defense
attorneys, like courts, are under no obligation to advise clients of col-
lateral consequence, including deportation. Kentucky argued that
there is no principled distinction between deportation and other col-
lateral consequences and warned of the slippery slope of ever increas-
ing obligations of defense counsel. 2 2 Padilla and his supporting amici
made three primary arguments: (1) because of dramatic changes in
immigration law over the past twenty years, making deportation a vir-
tually automatic and certain result of many convictions, it is now a di-
rect, not collateral, consequence;'2 1 (2) "deportation is different"-
even if deportation is a not a direct consequence it is a unique colla-
teral consequence because of its gravity and its close relationship to
the criminal conviction;12 and (3) the collateral consequences doc-
trine is inapposite because it governs the Court's obligation to insure
that a plea is knowing and intelligent, but the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement of effective assistance of counsel is not so limited.2 "
121 Brief of Respondent, sufpra note 107, at 18 ("Given the breadth and diversity of the con-
sequences noted, placing a duty on defense counsel to be aware and advise a defendant
of any likely collateral consequences would be overly burdensome and wholly impractic-
al.").
122 Id. at 40 ("Attempting to treat deportation differently than other collateral matters will
open the Pandora's box of collateral matters that will have to be addressed individually by
the courts, thereby further overburdening an overtaxed judicial system."); see abso Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223 ("[D]efense attorneys would be forced
to investigate and answer complex legal questions in which they have little or no expertise
or experience.").
123 Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116,
at 10, 18 ("Deportation is no longer a collateral consequence of conviction, as statutory
changes over the last two decades have made it automatic upon conviction of certain
crimes, with no discretionary relief... Deportation is thus a direct rather than a collater-
al consequence of an aggravated-felony conviction."); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113,
at 3 ("Because of recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, a great
number of criminal convictions now lead to the dire and inevitable consequence of de-
portation.").
124 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, at 51 ("Immigration consequences for persons con-
victed are so severe in nature and so immediately and deeply interwoven with the crimi-
nal prosecution and sentence that effective assistance of counsel must extend to protect-
ing the accused against such consequences.").
125 Id. at 18-50 (arguing that the origin and rationale of the collateral consequences rule are
inapposite to ineffective-assistance claims and that, in fact, they run afoul of Stickland);
Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 26, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) ("The Sixth Amend-
ment does not support a more rigid or formalistic conception of the attorney's duties at
the plea stage."). In the alternative, Padilla made the additional argument that even if no
affirmative advice is required under the Sixth Amendment, misadvice still renders a con-
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Notably, for our purposes, the parties and amicus briefs were rife
with discussions of the nature of removal proceedings. For his part,
Padilla argued "one can no longer draw distinct lines between crimi-
nal and immigration consequences.""" Amici, criminal and immigra-
tion law professors argued that "[s]tatutory changes have broken
down the walls between criminal and immigration proceed-
ings .... Similarly, amicus Constitutional Accountability Center
argued that "the line between penal and immigration consequences
has been blurred .*. . ."I2 Kentucky's argument relied to an even
greater extent on assertions about the nature of removal proceed-
ings. It argued that the "right to 'counsel for his defence' contem-
plates a criminal prosecution, not a civil proceeding," that the "crim-
inal sentencing court has no authority or control over civil
consequences arising from a criminal conviction," and that, there-
fore, "the constitutional standard focuses on attorney competence in
. . ,,129criminal cases, not civil or administrative cases.
In its decision, the Court first spent considerable time chronicling
the way immigration law has "changed dramatically over the last 90
years" such that the "'drastic measure' of deportation or removal is
now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of
crimes.',13 The Court noted that for more than a century after the
nation's founding, there were no immigration bars related to crimi-
nal convictions and that "radical changes" in 1917 (two decades after
the civil label was attached to deportation) led to the first American
law providing for the deportation of people convicted of crimes after
entry.'3 ' The Court also noted that, for the majority of the twentieth
century, criminal sentencing judges were empowered under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act ("INA") to enter binding judicial "rec-
ommendations" against deportation ('JRAD") at the time they
handed down criminal sentences, and that, therefore, mandatory de-
portation was not a feature of our immigration laws.132 In regard to
viction constitutionally infirm. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, at 55-60. This was
the position endorsed by the Solicitor General in her amicus brief. Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 122, at 25 ("[M]isadvice on immigration consequences can
rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland.").
126 Brief of Petitioner, sup-ra note 113, at 53.
127 Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116.
128 Brief of Constitutional Accountability Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15,
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
129 Brief of Respondent, supra note 107, at 9, 39-40, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
130 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted).
131 Id. at 1478-79.
132 Id. at 1479-80.
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JRAD, the Court spoke approvingly of a Second Circuit decision re-
cognizing aJRAD as "'part of the sentencing' process."'3 3 In light of
the dramatic changes in deportation law over the twentieth century,
the Court concluded that "deportation is an integral part-indeed,
sometimes the most important part of the penalty that may be im-
posed on noncitizen defendants ....
In Part II of its decision, the critical portion for our purposes, the
Court considered the parties' arguments regarding the direct or col-
lateral nature of immigration consequences. In so doing, the Court
waded into the forgotten debate about the civil or criminal nature of
deportation. It began by acknowledging the long line of precedent
characterizing deportation as civil but critically felt the need to quali-
fy the label: "We have long recognized that deportation is a particu-
larly severe 'penalty,' but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is never-
theless intimately related to the criminal process."'3I The Court recognized
that over the last century:
Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deporta-
tion for nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immi-
gration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad
class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it 'most difficult' to divorce
the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.
The Court, therefore, concluded that "[d]eportation as a conse-
quence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to
the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or
a collateral consequence.""
Ultimately, this entire discussion is dicta because the Court re-
solved the case by adopting Padilla's argument that the "collateral
versus direct distinction is . .. ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim
concerning the specific risk of deportation."' Instead the Court
looked to Strickland's reasonableness standard and adopted the mi-
nority position of lower courts: that defense counsel has an affirma-
tive duty to investigate and advise noncitizen clients of the potential
immigration consequences of a contemplated disposition-both si-
lence and affirmative misadvice are constitutionally deficient.'5
133 Id. at 1480 (citingJanvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir 1986)).
134 Id. at 1481.
135 Id. at 1483 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
136 Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (citation omitted).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1483. When the law is clear about the deportation consequences for a client, as was
the situation in Padilla's case, the Court said that it is the criminal defense attorney's
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The holding of Padilla will require a healthy transformation of the
defense bar's vision of its role and responsibility and will considerably
improve the measure of justice afforded to noncitizen defendants in
our criminal justice system. However, as I argue below, the Court's
discussion of the nature of removal proceedings and its ultimate con-
clusion that deportation is different, insofar as it cannot be classified
as either a direct or collateral consequence-a proxy for the criminal
and civil labels'"-could be the most important legacy of the Padilla
decision.
III. PADILLA AS A CRITICAL PIVOT POINT IN IMMIGRATION
JURISPRUDENCE
In the incrementalist modality of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
the Padilla Court's conclusion that deportation is "uniquely difficult
to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence"'4' could, in
time, come to be understood as the beginning of a radical restructur-
ing of the Court's conception of the civil or criminal nature of depor-
tation. If the Court continues in this direction, Padilla will be under-
stood as a pivot point in the Court's immigration jurisprudence-
marking the first time in over a century that the Court has substan-
tively considered the civil or criminal nature of deportation. As dis-
cussed below, there is good reason to be hopeful that an about-face is
coming from the rule laid out in Fong Yue Ting that deportation
proceedings are purely civil in nature.142 While ultimately dicta, Jus-
tice Stevens spent approximately half of the decision explaining how
much has changed in immigration law since Fong Yue Ting and how
these changes impact the nature of deportation. WhatJustice Stevens
clear "duty to give correct advice." Id. However, when the law is unclear or not straight-
forward, as the Court acknowledged is often the case, a criminal defense attorney only
has to "advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of ad-
verse immigration consequences." Id. In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Alito took the middle-ground approach largely adopted by a majority of lower
courts, arguing that a defense attorney's duty is to: "(1) refrain from unreasonably pro-
viding incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have
adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the
alien should consult an immigration attorney." Id. at 1496 (Alito,J., concurring). justice
Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, would have adopted Kentucky's extreme posi-
tion and held that even affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences does
not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 1500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because the sub-
ject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to
effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.").
140 See discussion infra Part Ill.A.
141 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
142 SeeFong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1983).
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describes is just the sort of change that can justify overruling long
standing but outdated precedent. Instead, Padilla suggests that the
Court is moving toward a recognition that "deportation is differ-
ent"-it lives in the netherworld between civil and criminal proceed-
ings, not truly belonging to either.
To attempt to predict the approaching arch of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence is, some would say, a fool's errand, and all would proba-
bly agree is, at minimum, a difficult task and an imprecise art. And
indeed there has been, for some time, no shortage of lower courts,14 3
dissenting judges,'4 or scholars'4 5 prodding the Court to reconsider its
143 See, e.g., Fadiga v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 488 F.Sd 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that al-
though the Sixth Amendment does not apply, "we cannot treat immigration proceedings
like everyday civil proceedings .. . because unlike in everyday civil proceedings, the liber-
ty of an individual is at stake in deportation proceedings." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J. concurring)
("[T]here are many areas of federal law where [the criminal and civil] distinction be-
comes blurred. Habeas corpus is one, civil forfeitures in conjunction with criminal pros-
ecutions is another, and immigration cases may well be a third."); McLeod v. Peterson,
283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960) (stating that deportation proceedings implicate "an especially
critical and fundamental individual right"); Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 F. 833, 838 (D.
Mass. 1915) ("To make the defendant's substantial rights in a matter involving personal
liberty [such as deportation proceedings] depend on whether the proceeding be called
'criminal' or 'civil' seems to me unsound.").
144 See, e.g., United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Ad-
ministrative determinations of liability to deportation have been sustained as constitu-
tional only by considering them to be exclusively civil in nature, with no criminal conse-
quences or connotations. That doctrine, early adopted against sharp dissent has been
adhered to with increasing logical difficulty as new causes for deportation, based not on
illegal entry but on conduct after admittance, have been added, and the period within
which deportation proceedings may be instituted has been extended."); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Banishment is punish-
ment in the practical sense. It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life
worth while."); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737-38 (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("Banishment
may be resorted to as punishment for crime, but among the powers reserved to the
people and not delegated to the government is that of determining whether whole classes
in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be driven from our
territory.").
145 See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 28, at 1931-35 (discussing the problematic lack of a com-
prehensive theoretical approach in the field of immigration law in general and deporta-
tion law in particular); Won Kidane, levisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable
in Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lesons from the Department of Labor Rules
ofEvidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 113-16 (2007) (noting the reasons to consider depor-
tation proceedings as criminal proceedings rather than as civil proceedings); Legomsky,
supra note 28, at 512 ("The now prolific case law dismissing deportation as civil rather
than criminal or otherwise punitive is long on citation of precedent and short on inde-
pendent reasoning."); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 327-41 (discussing the need to create a
new model for explaining the boundary between civil and criminal proceedings and the
Supreme Court's response to this need); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal
Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1780, 1786 (2010) ("There are
many obstacles that stand between the status quo and ajust immigration policy."); Pauw,
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conception of deportation proceedings. What then provides hope
that the Court will now be moved to action? A close reading of the
language used by the Court in Padilla and its contrast with other re-
cent Supreme Court pronouncements, an examination of trends in
the Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence, a survey of public
perception linking criminal and immigration law, and the opportuni-
ty to remedy the incoherent state of doctrine, together, I argue, pro-
vide good reason to believe change is coming.
A. Putting Padilla's Pronouncements in Context: Contrasting Past Supreme
Court Statements and Understanding the Link Between the Civil-Criminal
and the Collateral-Direct Divides
To many, the Court's description of the intimate link between de-
portation and criminal law will seem completely unsurprising. In-
deed, these concepts generally mirror public perception.1 4 6 However,
to students of the Court's immigration jurisprudence, it was startling
(and refreshing) to read these common sense pronouncements be-
cause of how sharply they contrast with prior Supreme Court state-
ments. In Lopez-Mendoza, for example, Justice O'Connor emphatically
declared that a "deportation proceeding is a purely civil action .... ."14
This language echoes early statements calling deportation "exclusively"
and "only" 4 1 civil and noting that the Court has "consistently classified
[deportation] as a civil rather than a criminal procedure." 4 9 justice
supra note 28, at 319-45 (asserting the need for the execessive punishment inflicted by
deportation to be limited by the same constitutional provisions that are applied in other
contexts); Stumpf, supra note 32 (proposing "a new approach to immigration sanctions
based on the graduated penalty system in the criminal realm"); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact
or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47,
82-89 (2010) (discussing removal as a criminal sanction and assessing whether it is an ef-
fective and appropriate punishment for crime).
146 See discussion infra Part III.I.C.
147 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (emphasis added).
148 Spector, 343 U.S. at 178-79 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (describing Su-
preme Court precedent).
149 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added). There was a period in the mid-twentieth
century when the Supreme Court did exhibit some unease with the civil label's applica-
tion to deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (charac-
terizing the rule that deportation is not penal as "highly fictional"); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (explaining that if the Court were "writing on a clean slate ... it
might fairly be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to puni-
tive legislation, should be applied to deportation"); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (characte-
rizing the civil designation of deportation "debatable"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 231 (1951) (describing the "grave nature of deportation"); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (describing deportation as a "drastic measure"); Delgadillo v. Car-
michael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (drawing attention to the "high and momentous"
stakes in deportation proceedings); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("That
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O'Connor's oft-quoted pronouncement about the "purely" civil na-
ture of deportation has, for a quarter century, been understood by
lower courts as a clear signal not to venture into the criminal-civil de-
bate.'50 As the Ninth Circuit explained:
[W]hether an alien will be removed is still up to the INS. There is a
process to go through, and it is wholly independent of the court impos-
ing sentence. The Supreme Court has made this clear by describing de-
portation as a 'purely civil action' separate and distinct from a criminal
proceeding. Removal is not part of the sentence; future immigration
consequences do not bear on the 'range of the defendant's punishment'
imposed by the court, and deportation is not punishment for the
.151crime.
We would expect that the Padilla Court's conclusion that "deporta-
tion is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important
part-of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants
who plead guilty"'52 should alter the Ninth Circuit's, and other
courts', understanding of the nature of deportation.
However, despite its musing about the civil or criminal nature of
deportation, the Court's ultimate conclusion was, on its face, about
the facially distinct direct or collateral designation-
"Deportation .. . is ... uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct
or a collateral consequence."'5 To understand the import of this
statement for the civil-criminal debate, we must understand some-
thing about the connection between these two doctrinal strands-the
civil-criminal divide and the collateral consequences doctrine. Be-
cause of the intimate connection between the two doctrines, and in-
deed because the Padilla Court made this connection explicit, we can
understand the Court's inability to classify deportation as direct or
collateral as a proxy for-or at minimum strongly suggesting-a simi-
deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted."); see aLo
Markowitz, supra note 7, at 298-307 (discussing the evolution of Supreme Courtjurispru-
dence regarding the civil label).
150 See, e.g., Csekinek v. INS, 391 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2004) (referring to deportation pro-
ceedings as civil rather than criminal in nature, in light of Supreme Court holdings); Ca-
detv. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723 (6th
Cir. 2003); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Drummond,
240 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Avila-Gonzalez, No. 98-1391,
1999 WL 1037572, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1999); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517,
1520 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996); Sene v. INS, No. 95-3104, 1996 WiL 667906, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov.
19, 1996); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991); Maldonado-Perez v.
INS, 865 F.2d 328, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
151 Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d at 516 (citations omitted) (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1038).
152 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
153 Id. at 1482.
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lar conclusion that deportation is neither purely civil, nor purely
criminal, in nature.
The collateral consequences doctrine is a creation of the lower
courts attempting to define the scope of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement that "a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made
voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences." 5 4 As the Third Circuit explained:
It has been stated broadly that out of just consideration for persons ac-
cused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be ac-
cepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full under-
standing of the consequences. But the pertinent question is: what
consequences? To hold that no valid sentence of conviction can be en-
tered under a plea of guilty unless the defendant is first apprised of all
collateral legal consequences of the conviction would result in a mass ex-
155
odus from the federal penitentiaries.
Accordingly, lower courts developed the rule that, before a defendant
pleads guilty to a crime, he must first be appraised of the direct, but
not the collateral, consequences of his plea in order to ensure that he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights in accordance with due
156process.
The case commonly cited as the origin of the doctrine is United
States v. Parrino,5 which specifically considered whether a defendant
must be warned that a guilty plea could subject him to deportation.
In Parrino the Second Circuit determined, without discussion, that
deportation is a "collateral consequence of conviction" and, with sub-
stantial discussion, concluded that "the finality of a conviction on a
plea of guilty" does not depend "upon a contemporaneous realiza-
tion by the defendant of the collateral consequences thereof."'8 The
collateral consequences doctrine has since been adopted by every
other circuit court of appeals.'5 9
154 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
155 United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (citation omitted).
156 Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (reiterating the "long-standing
rule in this as well as other circuits that the trial judge when accepting a plea of guilty is
not bound to inquire whether a defendant is aware of the collateral effects of his plea");
Cariola, 323 F.2d at 186 ("[T]he factual situations which have occasioned the [plea of
guilty] afford no basis for holding that the finality of a conviction depends upon a con-
temporaneous realization by the defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea.");
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (1) (codifying the rule).
157 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954).
158 Id. at 921-22.
159 See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); Duke v. Cockrell, 292 F.3d 414,
417 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2002); El-
Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234,
236 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1989);
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While the Supreme Court has never itself explicitly adopted the
doctrine, its statement in Brady v. United States that "[t] he standard as
to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that. . . '[a]
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences,""60 has been interpreted by some lower courts as an affir-
mance of the collateral consequences doctrine.'"' The Supreme
Court has never, however, articulated any standard to distinguish col-
lateral from direct consequences and, in fact, in Padilla recognized
divergent standards employed by the lower courts for that purpose.16
One thing that all courts seem to agree upon, however, is the close
link between the determination of whether a consequence is collater-
al and whether it is civil.'6 3  The link is so close, in fact, that some
Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-
Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir.
1984); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1973); Unit-
ed States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
160 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc)).
161 See, e.g., Sambro, 454 F.2d at 922 ("We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said
when it used the word 'direct'; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.").
162 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 n.8 (2010) ("There is some disagreement
among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences.");
id. at 1487 (Alito,J., concurring) (acknowledging that "the line between 'direct' and 'col-
lateral' consequences is not always clear"). Compare, Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 ("The dis-
tinction between 'direct' and 'collateral' consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded
in the relevant decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate
and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment."), with Torrey,
842 F.2d at 236 ("[T]he determination that a particular consequence is 'collater-
al' . . . rest[s] on the fact that it was in the hands of another government agency or in the
hands of the defendant himself."), and United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir.
2000) ("However 'automatically' Gonzalez's deportation-or administrative detention-
might follow from his conviction, it remains beyond the control and responsibility of the
district court in which that conviction was entered and it thus remains a collateral conse-
quence thereof.").
163 See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convic-
tions and Reentry Issues Faced by IFrmerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 687
(2006) ("[A]ppellate courts... hold that neither defense attorneys nor trial courts are
required to inform defendants of these consequences as part of the guilty plea or sen-
tencing process. As a result, the non-criminal nature of these consequences separates
them from the criminal punishment imposed upon the defendant."); Sweeney, supra note
145, at 52 (stating that courts have generally found defendants "to be entitled to the con-
stitutional protections of criminal proceedings only when they have found a consequence
of conviction to be punitive (rather than remedial) in nature and the direct (rather than
collateral) consequence of the coniction"); see alsojenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinfomnation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 119, 194 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should breach the distinction be-
tween direct and collateral); Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Crim-
inal Convictions in American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYs. J. 145, 146
(2008) (finding that collateral consequences are often discussed in courtrooms but to a
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courts treat them as a singular inquiry.'6" Even when courts purport
to impose some other standard, such standards are almost always, in
practice, mere proxies for the civil label.' Thus, courts tend to use
the term "collateral consequence" as synonymous with "civil conse-
quence" and, practically, there is rarely any daylight between the two
determinations.'" The Padilla Court itself conflates the discussion of
the criminal-civil nature of deportation with the collateral-direct de-
widely varying and uncertain extent); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral
and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictiorn: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent
Predators," 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 689 (2008) (describing the framework applied by the
lower courts in determining whether a consequence is direct or collateral).
164 See, e.g., United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that deporta-
tion is a collateral consequence because it "is a civil proceeding which may result from a
criminal prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding.");
Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1367 (holding that post-conviction civil commitment is collateral be-
cause it is "not imposed in the nature of punishment; it results from a civil, not a criminal
proceeding"); Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that
even automatic consequences are collateral if they are "remedial and civil rather than
punitive").
165 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating the
rule "limit[ing] the direct consequences of a guilty plea to the immediate and automatic
consequences of that plea" and yet holding that "regardless of certainty, deportation is a col-
lateral consequence of a guilty plea" (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515-16 (9th Cir.
2002) (formulating the inquiry into whether "the consequence is contingent upon action
taken by an individual or individuals other than the sentencing court" but also relying on
the Supreme Court's statements that deportation is a purely civil action that is not pu-
nishment for a crime); Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27 (inquiring whether the consequence is
imposed by an agency "beyond the control and responsibility" of the court in which that
conviction was entered, which because of double jeopardy limits means only civil conse-
quence can be collateral).
166 See generally United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (explaining that a pro-
ceeding is criminal if the legislature designates it as such, or, if labeled by the legislature
as civil, it will nonetheless be deemed criminal if the penalty is so punitive in nature as to
overcome the legislature's intent); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (setting forth the following factors to evaluate the punitive nature of a proceed-
ing: (1) "[wlhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint[;]" (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded as punishment[;" (3) "whether it comes into
play only upon finding of scienter[;]" (4) "whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence[;]" (5) "whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime[;]" (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it[;]" and (7) "whether it appears excessive in re-
lation to the alternative purpose assigned"); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 327-32 (applying
the modern civil-criminal divide test to deportation). There are a few minor exceptions
to this rule but they do not alter the analysis significantly. See, e.g., Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d
at 516 (reemphasizing the connection between the collateral consequences doctrine and
the criminal-civil divide by explaining that the statutes at issue in Littlejohn, unlike the sta-
tutes governing deportation, are part of the criminal code); United States v. Littlejohn,
224 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the civil sanction of ineligibility for feder-
al benefits-such as food stamps and social security-was a direct consequence because
"these sections automatically affect the range of [the defendant's] punishment").
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signation, moving back and forth between discussing the two without
distinction. Thus, when we evaluate the Court's pronouncements
in Padilla against this backdrop regarding the collateral consequences
doctrine and contrast the pronouncements with prior statements of
the Court declaring the "purely" civil nature of deportation, the im-
port and significance of the decision for our understanding of the
fundamental nature of deportation begins to come into view.
B. Trends in the Supreme Court's Immigration jurisprudence: Crescendoing
Discomfort with the Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Norms
Notwithstanding the dramatic statements in Padilla and the sharp
divergence from prior Supreme Court characterizations of deporta-
tion, the Court's discussion remains dicta and such singular state-
ments in dicta are not alone sufficient to indicate a sea of change in
immigration jurisprudence. However, when viewed together with
other significant trends in Supreme Court immigration jurispru-
dence, a clearer picture of the forthcoming evolution of the Court's
conception of deportation comes into focus. Specifically, a review of
the immigration cases decided by the Court over the last two decades
reveals a surprising trend that, together with Padilla, evince the
Court's crescendoing discomfort with the asymmetric incorporation
of criminal justice norms into deportation proceedings and thus gives
us further reason to believe the Court may be prepared to reconcep-
tualize the nature of deportation proceedings.
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have been described as the
most conservative Supreme Courts in the history of the United
States.'" Empirical data bears out these characterizations.69 The
167 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (acknowledging the difficulty of applying the direct-
collateral distinction to deportation).
168 See, e.g., Eric R. Clacys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 405 (2004) ("The Rehnquist Court is widely
believed to be the most conservative Court in recent memory. Especially in the legal
academy, the Rehnquist Court has a reputation as being conservative in its politics, origi-
nalist in its interpretive commitments, and suspicious of the New Deal."); Michael Vitiel-
lo, Liberal Bias in the Legal Academy: Overstated and Undervalued, 77 Miss. L.J. 507, 565
(2007) ("[F]ew can deny that [the Roberts Court] is one of the most conservative Courts
in modern history.").
169 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rationaljudicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 782 tbl.3 (2009) (ranking Justices Thomas, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Roberts, Alito, O'Connor, and Kennedy as among the ten most conservative justic-
es to serve since 1937); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html
(analyzing data from multiple empirical studies and databases that track Supreme Court
voting and reporting that "the Roberts [C]ourt has staked out territory to the right of the
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Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have, in general, been hostile to civil
liberties and civil rights claims and, in particular, to the rights of po-
litically disfavored groups."o Accordingly, one would expect that
claims advancing immigrants' rights would not have fared well before
these conservative courts. To the contrary, however, the Court has
often surprised everyone by handing down unexpected and resound-
ing victories on behalf of immigrants."' Moreover, many of these vic-
tories were lopsided wins, with immigrants garnering significant sup-
port from the Court's conservative voting block. 172
two conservative [C]ourts that immediately preceded it"). See generally Lee Esptein, Tho-
mas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason Roberts, The U.S. Supreme Court
justices Database, N.W. L. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://epstein.aw.northwestern.edu/
research/justicesdata.html (providing raw data on individual Justices' voting patterns).
170 See Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing Failure-to-Protect Claims Under State Constitu-
tions Via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1294, 1329 (2010) (noting the
"sharp curtailment in the national interpretation and application of civil liberties" under
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Be-
came the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and
the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076 (2010) (arguing that recent
Courts have "afforded vast discretion to law enforcement" in ways that have "exacerbated
problems with racial profiling"); Landes & Posner, supra note 169 (indicating the high
conservative voting rates of the majorities of the Rehquist and Roberts Courts on civil li-
berties cases); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Decision-Making Trends of the
Rehnquist Court Era: Civil Rights and Liberties Cases, 89 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (2005) (find-
ing that the Rehnquist Court handed down conservative decisions rejecting individual
claims in the majority of civil liberties cases).
171 See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (rejecting the well-established majority view that failure
to advise regarding immigration consequences of a conviction does not constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment); Lopez v. Gonzales,
549 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006) (adopting the minority view of the circuits to hold that state fe-
lony drug offenses are not necessarily aggravated felonies under immigration law); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324-26 (2001) (refusing to apply retroactivity to numerous statutory
provisions stripping immigration judges of discretion to grant relief and federal courts of
judicial review over deportation orders, despite contrary agency interpretations); Zadvy-
das v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700-02 (2001) (adopting the minority position of lower courts
to hold that immigration officials may not indefinitely detain an immigrant ordered de-
ported).
172 See, e.g, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding unanimously in
favor of the immigrant, with Justices Alito and Thomas concurring in the judgment); Pa-
dilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477, 1487 (resolving the decision 7-2 in favor of the immigrant, with
the concurrence also adopting the minority position that counsel has a duty to advise but
framing that duty to advise more narrowly than the Court); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct.
827, 830 (2010) (finding unanimously in favor of the immigrant, with Justice Alito con-
curring in thejudgment); Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1753, 1762 (2009) (deciding
the question 7-2, and reflecting clear concern over the quality of justice in removal pro-
ceedings and the error-correcting role played by federal courts); Flores-Figueroa v. Unit-
ed States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888, 1894 (2009) (holding unanimously in favor of the immi-
grant, with Justices Scalia and Thomas andJustice Alito separately concurring in part and
in the judgment; the Justices were unanimously troubled by the aggressive interpretation
of the immigration-related criminal statute at issue); Lopez, 549 U.S. at 50, 60 (resolving
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In order to systematically evaluate the Court's approach to immi-
gration cases, I reviewed all immigration cases decided by both the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.13  To hone in on the level of the
the decision 8-1, with Justice Thomas dissenting); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3 (2004)
(holding unanimously in favor of the immigrant).
173 I defined immigration cases as direct appeals from removal orders and appeals of habeas
petitions related to the detention of respondents in removal proceedings. There were
twenty-five such cases. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010)
(win, determining that defendant's second Texas offense of simple drug possession was
not "aggravated felony," so as to preclude cancellation of removal, where second convic-
tion was not based on fact of prior conviction); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010)
(win, finding that provision of the Illegal Immigrantion Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act ("IIRIRA"), limiting court's authority to review any action of the Attorney
General the authority for which was specified tinder the Act to be within his discretion,
did not apply to preclude judicial review of the BIA order); Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
1159, 1163 (2009) (win, pointing out that the BIA must interpret the statute barring an
alien from obtaining refugee status while at the same time considering whether an alien
is compelled to assist in persecution); Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (loss,
holding that clear and convincing evidence supported finding that the loss resulting from
defendant's offenses was greater than $10,000); Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (win, ruling that
traditional stay factors governed a court of appeals' authority to stay an alien's removal
pending judicial review, as opposed to the more demanding standard of the INA); Dada
v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008) (win, holding that an alien must be permitted an opportu-
nity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided that such a request is made
before the expiration of the departure period); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,
194 (2007) (loss, finding that a "theft offense," for which alien may be removed, includes
the crime of "aiding and abetting," a theft offense); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548
U.S. 30 (2006) (loss, holding that the INA provision for reinstatement of removal orders
against aliens illegally re-entering the United States also applied to aliens who re-entered
the United States before IIRIRA effective date); Lopez, 549 U.S. 47 (win, determining that
an alien was not disqualified from discretionary cancellation of removal for conduct that
is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (win, finding that the INA time limit,
for how long the government may detain aliens who have been found removable or who
have been deemed inadmissible, can be stretched to that reasonably necessary to effect
removal); Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (loss, ruling
that Somalia's inability to consent in advance to alien's removal did not preclude his re-
moval to Somalia as country of his birth); Leoca4 543 U.S. at 10-12 (win, holding that ab-
rogating alien's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") and caus-
ing serious bodily injury in an accident in violation of Florida law was not a "crime of
violence" and therefore was not an "aggravated felony" warranting deportation); Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (loss, deciding that the detention of an alien pursuant to no-
bail provision of INA did not violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
because Congress was justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who were not
detained would continue to engage in criminal activities and fail to appear for their re-
moval hearings); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (loss, upholding statute
making it more difficult for children who are born abroad and out of wedlock to one
United States parent to claim citizenship through that parent if the citizen parent was the
father); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (loss, determining that Court of
Appeals lacked jurisdiction for review of final orders of removal, butjurisdiction-stripping
provision of IIRIRA did not preclude aliens, who had been found removable based on
their prior aggravated felony convictions, from filing habeas petitions in district court);
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Court's discomfort with the lack of criminal protection afforded to
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289 (win, holding that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") and IIRIRA did not deprive the Court ofjurisdiction to review alien's habeas
petition, and provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA repealing discretionary relief from depor-
tation did not apply retroactively to alien who pled guilty to sale of controlled substance
prior to statutes' enactment); Zadvydav, 533 U.S. at (win, finding that (1) INA's post-
removal-period detention provision contains implicit reasonableness limitation; (2) fed-
eral habeas statute grants federal courts authority to decide whether given post-removal-
period detention is statutorily authorized; and (3) presumptive limit to reasonable dura-
tion of post-removal-period detention is six months); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415
(1999) (loss, deciding that statute making alien who has committed serious nonpolitical
crime ineligible for withholding of deportation on ground that he would be subject to
persecution did not require balancing alien's criminal acts against the risk of persecution
he would face if returned to his home country); INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26
(1996) (loss, finding that the Attorney General could consider acts of fraud committed by
an alien in connection with his entry into the United States when deciding whether to
grant a discretionary waiver of deportation); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (loss,
holding that a timely motion for reconsideration of a BIA decision does not toll the run-
ning of the ninety-day period for review of final deportation orders); Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292 (1993) (loss, ruling that a regulation permitting detained juvenile aliens to be
released only to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and
compelling circumstances, does not facially violate substantive due process); INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (loss, determining that a guerrilla organization's at-
tempt to conscript a Guatemalan native into its military forces did not necessarily consti-
tute "persecution on account of political opinion" within meaning of statute permitting
asylum if alien is unable or unwilling to return to home); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129
(1991) (loss, holding that administrative deportation proceedings are not adversary adju-
dications under section for which the EAJA waives sovereign immunity and authorizes
award of attorney fees and costs); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (loss, finding that the
abuse of discretion standard applies to the review of a BIA decision denying a motion to
reopen deportation proceedings on ground that alien had not reasonably explained his
failure to assert his asylum claim at outset); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987) (win, holding that in order to show "well-founded fear of persecution," an alien
seeking asylum need not prove that it is "more likely than not" that he or she will be per-
secuted in his or her own country). The value of the findings set forth below, see infra
notes 176-91 and accompanying text, are obviously limited by the relatively modest sam-
ple size of the study but this comprehensive review of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
immigration jurisprudence is the best available data for the purpose. Ironically, this defi-
nition does not capture the Padilk case itself. In addition to the Padilla cases, there are a
handful criminal-type appeals and affirmative lawsuits that are potentially also relevant to
the analysis. As discussed infra notes 176, 183, 185, the inclusion or exclusion of these
cases does not affect the analysis. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (presenting a criminal-
type appeal related to deportation); United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009)
(same); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (defining ex-
clusive jurisdiction clause of IIRIRA, illustrating an affirmative lawsuit related to deporta-
tion); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding the President's
power to order Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high
seas, exemplifying an affirmative lawsuit about immigration enforcement policy); INS v.
Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (upholding the Attorney General's
broad powers, exemplifying another affirmative lawsuit related to deportation); United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (presenting a criminal-type appeal related
to deportation).
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immigrants, I then compared the win rate of immigrants to the win
rate of criminal defendants. I chose this comparison because crimi-
nal defendants are a likewise politically disfavored class of litigants,
but there is, of course, no asymmetry insofar as criminal enforcement
norms are utilized but constitutional criminal protections are also af-
forded. Admittedly, the comparison remains a somewhat blunt in-
strument to assess the Court's discomfort with the current characteri-
zation of removal proceedings. But this data is used here only to
round out the picture-to supplement the analysis of the plain lan-
guage in Padilla and the other factors set forth below. 7 4
Absent the lack of asymmetry in deportation proceedings, one
would expect to find relatively similar treatment of criminal defen-
dants and immigrants facing deportation from the conservative
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. 1" In fact, we find that immigrants
fared significantly better than criminal defendants with immigrants
prevailing in 48% 176 of immigration cases and criminal defendants
prevailing only 40%"' of the time. While this disparity is significant,
174 See discussion infra Part III.A, I.C-I.D.
175 One could challenge this assumption and hypothesize that the disparate win rate dis-
cussed below, see discussion infra notes 176-91, are in fact attributable to other factors in-
cluding, for example, the greater political disfavor accorded to criminal defendants.
However, such explanations do little to explain the trend in immigrant win rate discussed
infra notes 176-91.
176 Immigrants prevailed in twelve of the twenty-five cases. See discussion supra note 173. If
we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to 53% (15/28), and if we in-
clude the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings as well, the percentage
remains unchanged at 48% (15/31).
177 Defendants won 157 of 394 cases before the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. See Christo-
pher E. Smith, Criminaljustice and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (finding a defendant win rate of 35%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal
justice and the 1996-97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 29, 33 (1997) (find-
ing a defendant win rate of 30%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal justice and the 1997-98
U.S. Supreme Court Tenn, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443, 445 (1999) (finding a defendant win rate of
37%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal]ustice and the 1998-99 U. S. Supreme Court Term, 9
WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 23, 28 (1999) (finding a defendant win rate of 41%); Christopher E.
Smith, Criminal justice and the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77 N.D. L. REV. 1, 4
(2001) (finding a defendant win rate of 39%); Christopher E. Smith & Steven B. Dow,
Criminaliustice and the 2000-2001 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189,
193 (2002) (finding a defendant win rate of 40%); Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist
Court and Criminaljustice: An Empirical Assesment, 19J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM.JUSTICE 161,
170 (2003) (aggregating the results of the preceding studies); Christopher E. Smith &
Madhavi McCall, Criminal justice and the 2001-02 United States Supreme Court Term, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 417 (2003) (finding a defendant win rate of 33%); Christopher E.
Smith & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice and the 2002-2003 United Statev Supreme Court
Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 863-64 (2004) (finding a defendant win rate of 36%); Chris-
topher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice and the 2003-2004
United States Supreme Court Term, 35 N.M. L. REV. 123, 127 (2005) (finding a defendant win
rate of 46%); Christopher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice
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it is not alone extraordinary and is potentially explained by factors
other than the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms in
deportation proceedings.1 8
However, the most important finding is not the overall win rate
but rather the dramatic trend over time. Over the life of the Rehn-
quist and Roberts Court we have seen the steady growth of the crim-
migration crisis."9 As Professor Legomsky describes it, "[s]tarting ap-
proximately twenty years ago, and accelerating today, a clear trend
has come to define modern immigration law. Sometimes dubbed
'criminalization,' the trend has been to import criminal justice norms
into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation."'8 0 Accordingly,
to the extent that this asymmetry is reflected in the win rate of immi-
grants, we would expect to see the immigrant win rate rising together
with the increasing criminalization of immigration law. This is pre-
cisely the trend revealed by the data while, in contrast, criminal de-
fendants' win rates stayed relatively stagnant.
While there have been a number of significant events marking the
increased criminalization of immigration law, all pale in comparison
to the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).'" Accordingly, I organized the da-
and the 2004-2005 United States Supreme Court Term, 36 U. MEM. L. REv. 951, 957 (2006)
(finding a defendant win rate of 47%); Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Mad-
havi M. McCall, Crminal justice and the 2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25
QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 495, 499 (2007) (finding a defendant win rate of 43%); Michael A.
McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminaljustice and the 2006-2007
United Statev Supreme Court Term, 76 U.M.KC. L. REv. 993, 995-96 (2008) (finding a de-
fendant win rate of 36%); Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E.
Smith, Cfiminal justice and the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007-2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REv. 33, 38
(2008) (finding a defendant win rate of 50%); Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall &
Christopher E. Smith, Criminal justice and the US. Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Term, 29
Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2010) (finding a defendant win rate of 39%). Data for the 2009
term is not yet available and thus has not been included.
178 See discussion supra note 175.
179 See generally Stumpf, supra note 64 (discussing the criminalization of immigration law, or
"crimmigration law").
180 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 469.
181 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-590 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006)). See Lau-
ra S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic Immigration Law and
International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 988 (2002) (stating that under IIRIRA,
"immigration penalties for criminality have been greatly enhanced, contributing to the
criminalization of immigration law"); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1936 (2000)
(outlining the effects of the IIRIRA on lawful permanent U.S. residents); Helen Morris,
Zero Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1317, 1317 (1997) ("Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and [IIRIRA] added to the laundry list of 'aggravated felonies,' which effective-
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ta into three periods: (1) Rehnquist Court pre-IIRIRA immigration
cases; (2) Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA immigration cases; and (3)
Roberts Court immigration cases.'82 The change in immigrant win
rate over these periods is dramatic. During the Rehnquist Court pre-
IIRIRA period, before the explosion in the criminalization of immi-
gration law, immigrants won only 14% of the time.'13  This, interes-
tingly, was well below the criminal defendant win rate of 33% for the
same period.14  Since IIRIRA, however, along with the dramatic cri-
minalization of immigration law, immigrants' win rate drastically in-
creased to 61%,'8" well above the 41% win rate for criminal defen-
dants during that same period.8 , When we parse the post-IIRIRA rate
even further we see that the upward trend in immigrant wins contin-
ued as the criminalization of immigration law continued post-
IIRIRA." While immigrants won an impressive 57% 18 of their cases
ly preclude non-U.S. citizens from eligibility for almost every form of immigration re-
lief.").
182 The Rehnquist Court pre-IIRIRA immigration cases include all immigration cases, de-
fined supra note 173, decided by the Court between the 1987-88 term and the 1996-97
term. The Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA immigration cases include all immigration cases
decided by the Court between the 1997-98 and the 2004-05 term. The Roberts Court
immigration cases include all immigration cases decided by the Court from the 2005-06
term through the present.
183 Immigrants prevailed in only one of the seven cases heard during this period. See discus-
sion supra note 173. If we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to
25% (2/8), and if we include the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings
as well, immigrants won 20% (2/10) of the time. See id.
184 See Criminal justice and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177 (finding a de-
fendant win rate of 34.6%); Criminal justice and the 1996-97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra
note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of 30%). Unfortunately, the available data for the
pre-IIRIRA Rehnquist Court's criminal justices cases are limited to only two terms (1995-
96 and 1996-97). Accordingly, the data for this period is very incomplete, which could
explain why this is the only period that shows any significant deviation from the 40% win
rate that criminal defendants enjoyed during all other periods considered.
185 Immigrants prevailed in eleven of the eighteen cases heard during this period. See cases
cited supra note 173. If we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage rises to 65%
(13/20), and if we include the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings as
well, immigrants won 62% (13/21) of the time.
186 Post-IIRIRA defendants won 140 of 342 cases. See sources cited supra note 177.
187 Significant post-IIRIRA events include: increased use of local police to enforce immigra-
tion laws, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 13 5 7 (g) (2006) (authorizing agreements with states and lo-
calities to deputize non-federal agents to perform the functions of federal immigration
enforcement officials); increased use of criminal enforcement tactics in enforcing civil
immigration law violations, such as SWAT-style home raids, see CHIU ET AL., supra note 98,
at 1-6 (analyzing the constitutional violations occurring during home raids by the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency ("ICE")); a program whereby civil immi-
gration information was entered into the FBI's principal criminal database, see Complaint
at 1, Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Ashcroft, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 03-
CV-6324) (alleging on personal knowledge that government agencies have, without lawful
authority, begun entering civil immigration information into the FBI's principal crime
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during the Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA period,89 their win rate con-
tinued to increase thereafter with immigrants prevailing in 63%190 of
cases before the Roberts Court. When viewed in comparison to crim-
inal defendants, who only prevailed 43% of the time before the Ro-
berts Court, the immigrant win rate is startling."' It is also notable
that, over these periods, while immigrants' fortunes were improving
the Court overall was moving consistently to the right.'92 Ultimately,
what the data reveals is that not only have immigrants fared relatively
well overall before these conservative Courts, as compared to criminal
defendants, but that immigrants' fortunes made dramatic and consis-
tent gains tracking the dramatic and consistent criminalization of
immigration law.'93  The correlating crescendoing trends, when
database); the "Secure Communities" program, in which information from state and local
police bookings is electronically forwarded to federal immigration enforcement officials,
see Complaint at 6-9, Nat'l Day Laborer Organizing Network v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, No. 10-CV-3488 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/SC ComplaintREALFINAL.pdf (critiquing the implementation and reliability of
the Secure Communities program); and the large-scale use of preventive detention, see,
e.g., Legomsky, supra note 28, at 489-94 (considering the accelerated use of preventative
detention in immigration proceedings).
188 Immigrants prevailed in four of the seven cases heard during this period. There were no
relevant criminal-type appeals during this period, and if we include the affirmative law-
suits related to deportation proceedings immigrants won 50% (4/8) of the time.
189 This is compared with an approximately 40% victory rate for criminal defendants. See,
e.g., Criminal justice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminaljus-
tice and the 1998-99 United States Supreme Court Tem, supra note 177; Criminaljustice and the
1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal justice and the 2000-2001 U.S.
Supreme Court Tem, supra note 177; Criminal justice and the 2001-02 United States Supreme
Court Term, supra note 177; CriminalJustice and the 2002-2003 United States Supreme Court
Term, supra note 177; Criminal justice and the 2003-2004 United States Supreme Court Tem,
supra note 177; Criminal justice and the 2004-2005 United States Supreme Court Term, supra
note 177.
190 Immigrants prevailed in seven of the eleven cases heard during this period. If we include
the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to 69% (9/13), and there were no cases
involving affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings during this period.
191 During the Roberts Court, defendants won 48 of 113 cases. See CriminalJustice and the
2005-2006 United States Supreme Court Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate
of 43%); Criminal justice and the 2006-2007 United States Supreme Court Term, supra note 177
(finding a defendant win rate of 36%); Criminal justice and the U.S. Supreme Courts 2007-
2008 Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of 50%); CriminalJustice and the
U.S. Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of
39%). Data for the 2009 term is not yet available and thus has not been included.
192 See sources cited supra note 169 (illustrating the Supreme Court's drift towards more con-
servative views).
193 There are, of course, other factors that could have contributed to immigrants' rising for-
tunes, such as over-reaching in enforcement efforts and an increasingly well-organized
immigration bar. However, while this data alone does not tell a conclusive story, read to-
gether with the language in Padilla and the other indicia set forth below, see discussion in-
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viewed together with the Padilla decision, are significant additional
evidence that the Court has grown uncomfortable with the asymme-
try that the civil label has created in deportation proceedings.'9
C. Public Perception Regarding the Link Between Criminal and Deportable
Offenses
The Supreme Court is sometimes referred to as an anti-
democratic institution.'95 Indeed, some understand the primary pur-
pose of the Supreme Court as a check on the otherwise democratic
nature of the government. Accordingly, it may seem counter-
intuitive to look at public perception as an indicia of where the Su-
preme Court is likely to go next. However, recent scholarship exam-
ining the role of popular opinion on Supreme Court decision-making
has led some to conclude that over time the Supreme Court has gone
from "being an institution intended to check the popular will to one
that frequently confirms it.""
fra Part III.C, it gives us good reason to believe the Court has grown uncomfortable with
the current state of affairs in deportation cases.
194 Others have suggested that the Court's tortured reasoning in some immigration cases or
its stretching to import criminal norms, see discussion infra Part III.D, is further evidence
of the Court's discomfort with the current state of the doctrine. See, e.g., Motomura, supra
note 25, at 564-76 (offering a thorough explanation of how courts' discomfort with their
inability to apply standard constitutional scrutiny to removal cases has led them to use
"phantom" constitutional norms to render purportedly subconstitutional decisions in fa-
vor of respondents); Slocum, suna note 91, at 522 (arguing that the Supreme Court has
created the immigration rule of lenity to offset the Court's extreme reluctance to con-
sider constitutional challenges to immigration statutes).
195 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICs 16 (2d ed. 1986) ("The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system."); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Con-
stitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532-33 (1998) ("These attacks on the legitimacy of
judgment in a democracy have left their mark ... on the public understanding of the ju-
dicial role and on the Supreme Court's understanding of its own role."); Barry Friedman,
The Histoiy of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
971, 972 (2000) (discussing the expectation that "the law operates in a world separate
and apart from that of politics" and "disdain [at] the notion of judges rendering deci-
sions tinder the threat of political retribution").
196 See BICKEL, supra note 195, at 16 ("Marshall ... spoke of enforcing, on behalf of 'the peo-
ple,' the limits that they have ordained for the institutions of a limited government.");
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Schol-
arship and judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1208-09 (1984) (discussing the contro-
versy over whetherjudicial activism is appropriate in a democratic society).
197 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2009); see also LEE
EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICESJUSTICES MAKE 17 (1998) (arguing that in order to
fully understand the choices Justices make, we must take into account the social context
in which they operate); Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme
Court: Individualjustice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 468
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Indeed, as Professor Barry Friedman recently chronicled:
Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment
of the American people .... On issue after contentious issue .. . the Su-
preme Court has rendered decisions that ... find support in the latest
Gallop Poll.. . .The Court will get ahead of the American people on
some issues .... On others ... it will lag behind. But over time ... the
Court and the public will come into basic alliance with each other.
This is so, Professor Friedman argues, because after President Roose-
velt's plan to pack the Court and other pivotal episodes in the Court's
history, modern "I[J ustices recognize the fragility of their position"
and thus "hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judg-
ment."
Accordingly, public perception regarding the civil or criminal na-
ture of deportation is at least one factor we should look to in consi-
dering the likelihood that the Court will move forward and solidify
the Padilla conception of deportation. Like Padilla, public percep-
tion increasingly and unambiguously conflates deportable offenses
and crimes. This is true on both sides of the ideological spectrum-
whether it is the liberal who is shocked to learn that detained immi-
grants do not receive appointed lawyers or the conservative talk show
caller who declares all "illegal immigrants are criminals., 200 Indeed,
(1997) ("[T]he Court's decisions generally, but not invariably coincide with the public's
preferences."); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of
judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2004) ("The work of judges happens as
much in the opinions as in the votes."); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least
Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,
66J. POL. 1018, 1018 (2004) ("To [some], the Supreme Court's dependence upon other
institutions to give force to its rulings creates a need to remain attentive to the changing
course of popular attitudes." (citation omitted)); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan,
The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? 1The Impact of Public Opinion on Su-
preme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 87, 87-88 (1993) (outlining several scholars'
theories on Supreme Court decisions and popular will).
198 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 197, at 14-15.
199 Id. at 14.
200 See, e.g.,Jim Garrett, Illegal Immigrants Are Criminals, ASBURY PARK PRESS, July 22, 2010, (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (equating immigration
violators and criminals); Illegal Immigrants Are Criminals, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-19/news/chi-100319loefmlerbriefs 1
criminals-reign-alien ("I cannot find 'undocumented' in my dictionary. This is [a] eu-
phemism for illegal alien. In my dictionary illegal means criminal."); Jaynee Germond, Il-
legal Means Criminal, JAYNEE GERMOND FOR US CONGRESS (Sept. 27, 2009),
http://jayneegermondforcongress.blogspot.com/2009/09/illegal-means-criminal.html
("What is so difficult about the concept of illegal immigration[?] Illegal means crimi-
nal .... Why aren't these known criminals deported immediately?"); Illegal Immigration Is
a Crime, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (Mar. 2005), http://www.fairus.org/site/
News2?page=NewsArticle&ir16663&security-1601&news iv ctrl=1007 (labeling "aliens
who flagrantly violate our nation's laws by unlawfully crossing U.S. borders and visa "over-
stayers" as "illegal immigrants" and noting that "[b]oth types of illegal immigrants are
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Americans increasingly view undocumented immigrants in particular,
and immigrants in general, as criminals. 20' This is so even though de-
portation proceedings continue to enjoy the formal "civil label" and
even though the great weight of empirical evidence demonstrates
that immigrants are less prone to criminal activity than native-born
202populations. It is the immigration violations themselves that are
perceived as criminal. Accordingly, a decision by the Supreme Court
explicitly holding that deportation proceedings are quasi-criminal, as
Padilla suggests, would, in Professor Freidman's words, bring "the
Court and the public ... into basic alliance with each other."203
D. The Opportunity to Make Sense of an Incoherent Doctrine
A final reason to believe that the Court may now be ready to re-
think the nature of removal proceedings is that such reconceptualiza-
tion is the only way to rescue the modern immigration jurisprudence
from its confused and indefensible current state. As discussed supra
Part 0, the rationale for the civil label-the "inherent powers
theory"-has long ago been repudiated by the Court, and no alterna-
tive justification has been substituted.20 4 Meanwhile, uniquely crimi-
nal law doctrinal strands increasingly weave their way into these pur-
portedly "purely civil proceedings."200 Only the principle of stare
decisis remains to justify the civil label and, at some point, stare deci-
sis is not enough.
The discussion in Padilla of the nature of deportation, viewed in
contrast to past Supreme Court pronouncements and in the context
deportable tinder [the] Immigration and Nationality Act Section 237(a) (1) (B)"). See gen-
erally M. Kathleen Dingerman & Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-
Deportation Experiences: En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U.
LA VERNE L. REv. 363, 367 (2010) ("[Immigrants] who are detained and deported from
the United States are perceived as not only 'undocumented laborers' but 'criminal
aliens.'").
201 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 503-04 ("Although the vast bulk of immigration to the Unit-
ed States occurs through legal channels, the public thinks the opposite is true." (footnote
omitted)).
202 RUBIN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT
CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF AssiMIlATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE
AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 3 (2007), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
defatlt/files/docs/Imm%20Criminality%20(IPC).pdf ("[In 2000] about three-fourths
(73 percent) of Americans believed that immigration is causally related to more
crime .... But this perception is not supported empirically .... [I]t is refuted by the
preponderance of scientific evidence. Both contemporary and historical data... have
shown repeatedly that immigration actually is associated with lower crime rates.").
203 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 197, at 15.
204 See discussion supra Part I.B.
205 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also discussion supra Part I.C.
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of the other evidence of the Court's increasing discomfort with the
asymmetric criminalization of immigration law, and the public's
growing perception conflating the two realms, gives us good reason
to believe that what we are seeing in Padilla is a turning point in the
Court's conception of deportation. Padilla represents the first step, a
significant step, toward a sea of change that will allow the Court to be
explicit about what is already apparent from the case law: deporta-
tion is neither purely civil nor is it purely criminal. Deportation lies
in the space between the two realms. This understanding will help
make sense of the partial incorporation of criminal doctrinal strands
that we already have seen and, more importantly, will require the
Court to grapple with the hard question of what other types of crimi-
nal protections should be afforded to respondents in deportation
proceedings. As this conception of "deportation as different" comes
to prominence, no longer will courts be able to escape engaging the
hard question by simple reference to the civil label. Some criminal
protections will apply and some will not, but it will take more than a
citation to Fong Yue Ting to resolve the matter. Below I offer an ana-
lytic framework to aid courts in making principled determinations of
what criminal-type protections to apply under this new conception of
deportation.
IV. HOW TO EVALUATE THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS UNDER
PADILLA'S CONCEPTION OF DEPORTATION
Courts have a clear constitutional mechanism for evaluating the
rights of criminal defendants206 and a well-developed line of cases to
207determine the rights of litigants in the civil contexts. One poten-
tially daunting obstacle to the full and explicit acceptance of Padilla's
new conception of deportation will be the lack of any recognized me-
chanism to evaluate the rights of respondents in proceedings that are
neither civil nor criminal. We can start from the premise that, consis-
tent with the conception of deportation as straddling the civil-
criminal divide, in some instances criminal-type protections will at-
tach and in some instances they will not. I hope herein to begin a
conversation in the scholarship aimed at aiding future judicial efforts
to conceptualize a way forward. Developing a complete framework to
206 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
207 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
213 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S.
1, 4 (1991); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469 (1986); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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evaluate the rights of respondents in quasi-criminal deportation pro-
ceedings will be a complex task and is beyond the scope of what can
be achieved here. Instead, I seek to lay out some basic principles that
can be used to begin the discussion and supportjudicial efforts in the
wake of Padilla.
First it is important to recognize that, as a practical matter, there is
ample precedent for selective incorporation of criminal rights into
non-criminal proceedings. Beyond the examples from the immigra-
tion realm already discussed,208 the Court has applied some rights
commonly associated with criminal proceedings to non-criminal pro-
ceedings, including juvenile delinquency proceedings,2 09 parental
- 210 * * 211termination proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, some
parole revocation proceedings, and court martial proceedings.
Moreover, there is significant scholarly support for the Court's sug-
gestion that deportation is quasi-criminal. 4  But the fact that it has
been done in the past and that scholars have validated the Court's
evolving conception of deportation does not resolve the central prob-
lem of how to decide which criminal protections apply and in what
form.
In order to develop a principled method of analysis it is useful to
begin by investigating the contrasting nature of the criminal and civil
methods for assessing rights. In the civil realm, we have the intuitive-
ly appealing Mathews balancing test.2 5  It seems eminently logical to
simply weigh
208 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
209 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 61 (1967) (applying criminal protection against self incri-
mination tojuvenile proceedings to determine delinquency).
210 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) ("When deprivation of parental status is at stake,
however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due.").
211 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (finding that a determination of appel-
lant's mental illness and dangerousness to himself and others must be proven by more
than the common civil preponderance of the evidence standard).
212 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85, 488-89 (1972) (holding that petitioner facing
civil parole revocation is entitled to some aspects of the traditionally criminal rights to
venue in location of the arrest and violation, the right to speedy preliminary adjudication,
and the right to confront a witness).
213 See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2222 (2009) (permitting a collateral attack
based on the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to proceed where
judgment of conviction was entered by a court-martial); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25, 33 (1976) (noting that "[t]he question of whether an accused in a court-martial
has a constitutional right to counsel has been much debated and never squarely resolved"
and avoiding the ultimate constitutional question).
214 See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 28; Fragomen, supra note 27; Kanstroom, supra note 28;
Pauw, supra note 28; Pinzon, supra note 28; Salinas, supra note 28; Torrey, supra note 28;
Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, supra note 28.
215 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
216
quirement would entail.
In the criminal realm, of course, we generally use a different
model to evaluate defendants' rights. In the criminal realm, the ap-
plicable rights operate, in most instances,2 " as a hard floor that apply
categorically to defendants regardless of the gravity of punishment,
the cost to the state, or how important the right is to ensure a "cor-
rect" outcome in the given case." In a criminal case, for example,
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the same hard floor right to ap-
pointed counsel to any indigent defendant subject to imprisonment,
regardless of whether the potential term of imprisonment is one day
or one hundred years.220 Every criminal defendant has the right to be
tried in the venue in which the alleged crime occurred regardless of
the convenience or inconvenience to the state.22 Even with judicially
216 Id.
217 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58, 361 (1977) (holding that a sentencing judge cannot impose the death sentence
on the basis of a confidential presentence report on the grounds that capital punishment
is "different in kind" from other forms of criminal punishment); see atro Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (establishing that the right to appointed counsel applies only if
the sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment).
218 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[I]n our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him .... Governments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime .... That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread
belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries .. .. From the very be-
ginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on proce-
dural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be rea-
lized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him.").
219 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); Josephine Ross, What's Relia-
bility Got to Do with the Confrontation Clause After Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REv. 383, 389
(2009). See generally Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative
Evidence in Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REv.
1097, 1100 (2003).
220 Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (holding that "no indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense").
221 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
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created criminal rights, we generally see the same hard floor model
being applied. For example, any criminal defendant has the right to
have their inculpatory statement suppressed if it was the product of
custodial interrogation without Miranda warning, regardless of
whether he or she faces minor misdemeanor or serious felony
h222charges.
We must then understand the rationale behind the different ap-
proaches utilized in civil and criminal cases. Why, for example, do we
not simply dispense with the hard floor model altogether and eva-
luate the rights of criminal defendants using the Mathews balancing
test? Or put another way, in the context of deportation, maybe the
problem is not the civil approach but rather that the courts have just
done a bad job applying the Mathews test in deportation cases. Maybe
the courts have just underestimated the gravity of deportation and
given too much weight to the potential cost to the state of greater
protections. Maybe the Supreme Court can just recalibrate the Ma-
thews balance. Maybe, but I think not. In fact, the Supreme Court
has given extraordinary lip service to the gravity of deportation, call-
ing it "a savage penalty"22 and "'the equivalent of banishment or ex-
ile'"22 4 that may result in the loss of "all that makes life worth living."2 5
I think there is something more fundamentally wrong with applying a
balancing test to deportation, at least as the initial inquiry.
The Constitution is, of course, the simple but unsatisfying answer
as to why we use the hard floor model in the criminal realm. It is un-
satisfying because it begs the question of why the Framers decided to
utilize the hard floor model of rights in criminal proceedings. Why
should a person accused of turnstile jumping, facing the prospect of
a day in jail (or less), receive the same full panoply of rights as a per-
son accused of rape, facing years in prison? The hard floor model is,
at times, extremely inefficient insofar as it sometimes uses a sledge
shall have been committed . . . ."); Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220-21 (1956)
("This requirement of venue states the public policy that fixes the situs of the trial in the
vicinage of the crime. . . ."); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704-05 (1946)
("The constitutional specification is geographic; and the geography prescribed is the dis-
trict or districts within which the offense is committed.").
222 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
223 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
224 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 390-391 (1947)).
225 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
226 Moreover, even judicially created criminal rights tend to utilize the hard floor model ra-
ther than a sliding scale model or balancing. See discussion supra notes 218-22 and ac-
companying text. There are, admittedly, rare examples of hard floor civil rights as well.
See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. VII (granting a limited right tojury trial).
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hammer of protections when a fly swatter would do. The balancing
test would allow a court to look at the individual circumstances, the
gravity of the potential penalty, the risk of error in the case, and the
cost of various protections to the state, and make a more refined in-
dividualized determination of whatjustice requires.
But the Framers found such individualized determinations unac-
ceptable in the criminal context, and with good reason. The reason
can be found in the concept of rule utilitarianism. The premise of
rule utilitarianism is that in some instances we can maximize human
well-being by application of static rules rather than through individu-
alized determinations.2 ' This can be so because bias can prevent us
from making accurate calculations of the optimal course of action in
2281individual cases or because we recognize there will always be, re-
gardless of bias, some error rate in our calculations, and the gravity of
error in one direction is such that it is optimal to create a fixed rule
skewed in favor of avoiding such grave errors. 229
These are precisely the dynamics at play that justify the hard floor
model of rights in criminal law. We are concerned that we cannot
trust courts, on a regular basis, to strike an optimum balance because
of two types of bias: bias against politically disfavored criminal de-
fendants and bias in favor of criminal justice actors (prosecutors and
police) who are regular collaborators with the court in the adminis-
230tration of justice. Moreover, our system makes a very conscious de
cision to skew the error rate in favor of wrongful acquittals, rather
than wrongful convictions, in recognition of the gravity of the loss
of physical liberty that can result in criminal cases and the severe so-
cial stigma associated with a criminal conviction.
227 R.M. HARE, ESSAYS ON POLITICAL MORALITY ch. 7-8 (1989); JJ.C. SMART, AN OUTLINE OF
A SYSTEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS 42-57 (1972); John Rawls, Two Conceplts of Rules, 64 PHIL.
REV., 3, 3-32.
228 SMART, supra note 227, at 43; GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 162 (1971).
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). See generally Keith A. Findley &
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L.
REV. 291 (2006); Steve Sheppard, The Metammphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in
the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165
(2003).
231 It has been a familiar axiom of criminal justice since at least the time of Blackstone that it
is "better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM
BiACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Har-
lan,J., concurring) ("[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man
go free.").
232 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting "the opprobrium and stigma of a
criminal conviction"); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996) (referring to
"the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction"); Scott v. Illinios, 440 U.S.
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Accordingly, when assessing whether (and how) a particular right
should apply in the deportation context, I propose, a three-step me-
thod of inquiry. "Step One" must be to determine whether the values
a criminal right seeks to protect are at issue in comparable ways in
the deportation context and thus whether the right applies at all in
deportation proceedings. "Step Two," assuming the right applies, is
to determine whether the right is to be applied in a category of de-
portation proceedings requiring criminal-style hard floor rights or a
category where the civil-style balancing model is more appropriate.
"Step Three" would be to determine the parameters of the right to be
applied under whichever model is employed.
Under "Step One," there will be some criminal rights that simply
do not warrant any application to the deportation context. This in-
quiry will turn primarily on the nature of the right and its practical
application to deportation proceedings. For example, the right to a
speedy trial is a core criminal right that serves to insure that criminal
defendants are provided the opportunity to test the state's evidence
at trial before witnesses' memories are faded and to ensure that the
specter of a criminal charge, and the reputational harm associated
with such a charge, does not hang indefinitely over the accused's
head. In non-detained deportation proceedings, the respondents'
interest is almost always served by prolonging the removal proceed-
ings. In deportation proceedings, the factual issues that require evi-
dentiary hearings often turn on the positive equities in a respon-
dent's life, not on some particular events on the single day of an
alleged offense, as in criminal proceedings. More time before trial
allows respondents to continue to develop positive equities such as
work history, community involvement, educational achievement, fam-
ily ties, and so on. Accordingly, the interests served by the speedy tri-
al right are simply not at play in the deportation proceedings for non-
detained respondents and thus do not apply. You can imagine a simi-
larly odd fit between the right to grand jury indictment and deporta-
tion and thus we would expect that this right, too, simply would not
apply.
Most criminal rights, however, will have some relevant application
to some deportation proceedings, and thus the critical inquiry will be
"Step Two": to determine whether the right is to be applied in a cat-
egory of deportation proceedings requiring a criminal hard floor
367, 372-73 (1979) (affirming that "incarceration [i]s so severe a sanction that it should
not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant ha[s] been of-
fered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States impli-
cit in such a rule").
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model or the civil balancing model. Unlike "Step One," this deter-
mination will, in most instances, turn on the nature of the respon-
dent or the nature of the proceedings, not the nature of the right.
The court would have to determine whether the factors that justify a
hard floor-(1) bias against a politically disfavored group; (2) bias in
favor of state enforcement actors who are regular collaborators with
the court in the administration ofjustice; (3) gravity of potential loss
of liberty; and (4) gravity of social stigma associated with a negative
outcome in the proceedings-are present in degrees comparable to
criminal proceedings. If they are, courts should utilize the hard floor
model because we can expect a static rule to ultimately maximize
human well-being.3 If they are not, courts can resort to traditional
civil balancing analysis, because we can expect an individualized de-
termination to more likely produce, on whole, desirable outcomes.
Some of these factors will be consistent across all deportation pro-
ceedings. For example, all noncitizens are disenfranchised and sub-
ject to some level of social animus in modern America.
234 Likewise,
we would expect to see a relatively consistent institutional bias of
courts, particularly immigration courts, in favor of their fellow actors
in the immigration enforcement scheme. Moreover, any deportation
will involve a significant restraint on liberty-the forced relocation
beyond our national boundary. However, these baseline commonali-
ties, I would propose, are not alone sufficient to trigger bias and dis-
proportionate harm sufficient to make all deportation proceedings
analogous to criminal proceedings such as to justify consistent appli-
cation of hard floor rules. Imagine, for example, an individual who
enters the United States as a business traveler from an economically
strong visa-waiver country and a week later receives a notice that he is
to appear for a deportation hearing because some technical defect
233 Though the floor may not be identical to the floor in criminal proceedings. See infra
notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
234 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 161-62 (1980) ("Aliens cannot vote in any
state, which means that any representation they receive will be exclusively 'virtual.' That
fact should at the very least require an unusually strong showing of a favorable environ-
ment for empathy, something that is lacking here. Hostility toward 'foreigners' is a time-
honored American tradition. Moreover, our legislatures are composed almost entirely of
citizens who have always been such. Neither, finally, is the exaggerated stereotyping to
which that situation lends itself ameliorated by any substantial degree of social inter-
course between recent immigrants and those who make the laws."); Kevin R. Johnson, A
Handicapped, Not "Sleeping," Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latinalo
and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1264-66 ("Noncitizens barred from
formal political participation are especially vulnerable to the whims of the majori-
ty .... Today's immigrants .. . suffer disfavor in the political process not only because of
their immigration status, but also because of their race.").
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was discovered with his entry documents, and he is forced thereby to
cut his business trip short. It would be hard to characterize such a
respondent as politically disfavored in any significant way. A short-
ened business trip is hardly a liberty deprivation comparable to crim-
inal incarceration, and it is doubtful that significant stigma would at-
tach to this scenario, here or in the visitor's home country.
But in other circumstances, the nature of the respondent or the
nature of the proceedings could well alter the analysis in ways that
would require application of a hard floor model. Take Padilla him-
self as an example. In regard to the nature of the respondent, Padilla
was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over forty
years, a veteran of the United States Army, and lived with his family in
the United States. It is not difficult to conceive of how such factors
change the analysis regarding the gravity of the liberty interest at
stake in the deportation proceedings. In regard to the nature of the
proceedings, Padilla was subject to mandatory detention, forced to
fight his case while incarcerated, and the sole charge against him was
the result of a criminal conviction. So, for Padilla, in addition to ul-
timate deportation, we see a physical deprivation of liberty equivalent
235to criminal incarceration, a stigma both here and in Honduras re-
lated to criminal deportees that equals and may even surpass the
2 "'stigma associated with many criminal convictions, and membership
in a group that garners almost unrivaled political disfavor-"criminal
aliens."2 3' Thus, in many ways Padilla presented the easiest scenario
235 SCHRIRO, supra note 10, at 4 ("As a matter of law, Immigration Detention is unlike Crimi-
nal Incarceration. Yet Immigration Detention and Criminal Incarceration detainees tend
to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations are typically ma-
naged in similar ways. Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with har-
dened perimeters in remote locations at considerable distances from counsel and/or
their communities. With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens
were originally built, and currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and
sentenced felons. Their design, construction, staffing plans, and population manage-
ment strategies are based largely upon the principles of command and control. Likewise,
ICE adopted standards that are based upon corrections law and promulgated by correc-
tional organizations to guide the operation ofjails and prisons.").
236 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 351 ("[T] here is already significant social stigma associated
with being deported and immigrants facing deportation are among the most politically
marginalized groups in American society.").
237 ICE aggressively promotes the specter of "criminal aliens" as a nationwide threat to com-
munity safety through press releases and marketing materials. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 87 Convicted Criminal Aliens and Fugitives Ar-
rested in ICE Enforcement Surges, (July 28, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1007/100728richmond.htm; U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Brochure (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/sectire-communities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf ("ICE is improving
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to argue in favor of application of criminal style protections-a long
term legal permanent resident ("LPR"), with U.S. citizen family, fac-
ing detained removal proceedings and automatic deportation as a di-
rect result of a criminal conviction. The Padilla Court's analysis
seems to place particular weight on the nexus between the criminal
conviction and the deportation proceedings." I have suggested
elsewhere that the status of the respondent as a lawful permanent res-
ident should be the overriding factor." Others have suggested that
detention is the critical issue.240 Which of these, or other characteris-
tics, would alone be sufficient to justify a rule utilitarian approach, or
which combination is necessary, is a difficult question I do not seek to
resolve here.
Assuming, however, that we have a right that applies ("Step One")
and a type of proceeding and/or respondent that justifies application
of a hard floor rule ("Step Two"), "Step Three" is to determine pre-
cisely the rule to be applied.24 1 When civil-type balancing is appropri-
ate, traditional Mathews analysis will suffice. For hard floor rights, this
will require courts to make categorical determinations regarding the
nature and scope of the right which will create optimal results across
the class of respondents or proceedings to which it applies.242 We
should not assume that the rule will operate in precisely the same
way, with the same hard floor, as in criminal proceedings.
Take for example, the right to appointed counsel-the criminal
right most coveted by immigrants in removal proceedings. If the cat-
egory to which the hard floor is being applied is respondents facing
criminal removal charges, one could well argue that counsel should
be appointed to all indigent respondents just as it is in criminal pro-
ceedings, for reasons discussed below. However, if the hard floor is
public safety by working to better identify, detain and ultimately remove dangerous crim-
inal aliens from your community.").
238 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) ("[Djeportation is nevertheless intimate-
ly related to the criminal process.").
239 Markowitz, supra note 7, at 315 ("[T]he most important critiques of the inherent powers
theory are those driven by an analysis based upon ... the special status of permanent res-
idents.").
240 Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4
STAN.J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 138-49 (2008).
241 Of course, if "Step Two" dictates that a balancing model should be employed then courts
would revert to traditional Mathews analysis.
242 Some may view this categorical determination as just a balancing exercise of another type.
Indeed, even when hard floor rights are utilized, some balancing will be required in de-
fining the scope of that right. However, having such balancing occur for broad classes of
respondents on an appellate level specifically guided by the factors set forth in step two-
potential bias and the gravity of the liberty interest-will better insure appropriate pro-
tections than leaving trial level courts to make individualized Mathews-type judgments.
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being applied instead to all detained immigrants, one could imagine
the Court defining a different scope of right to appointed counsel in
order to obtain that optimum balance of outcomes across all pro-
ceedings. Removal proceedings generally require immigration
judges to potentially make three determinations: (1) is a respondent
removable as charged; (2) is the respondent eligible for relief; and
(3) does the respondent warrant relief as a matter of discretion. In
the case of people facing removal charges based on criminal charges,
the first two issues often involve extraordinarily complicated legal is-
sues regarding the way federal immigration law maps onto the crimi-
nal code of a given state. Accordingly, on balance, if you are going to
apply a right to appointed counsel, it makes good sense to do so at
the outset of the proceeding for people with criminal removal
charges.
The large majority of non-criminal deportation proceedings,
however, involve much simpler deportability determinations: wheth-
er someone entered the country illegally or whether they have stayed
beyond the period authorized upon admission.24 3 For many respon-
dents facing such charges, the truth is that there is little that an at-
torney would be able to do to aid them in their case. If they over-
stayed their visa and are ineligible for relief, in the large majority of
cases, it is unlikely an attorney would be able to alter the outcome of
a proceeding. If, however, a court deems them prima facie eligible
for some form of relief, the success rates of applicants on applications
for relief vary dramatically depending on whether they are or are not
represented.2 4 4 Accordingly, it may be that in non-criminal removal
cases the hard floor right to appointed counsel applies only to res-
pondents who are prima facie eligible for relief. In the alternative,
because of the high percentage of deportation proceedings in which
the outcome would not be altered by appointed counsel,245 perhaps
243 See Individuas Charged in Immigration Court with Only Immigration Violations FY 1992-2006,
TRANSACrIONAI RECORDS ACCEss CLEARINCHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/178/include/only-immigration-charges.htmI (last visited May 11, 2011) (indi-
cating that nearly 65% of all individuals charged with removal for immigration violations
were charged with entry without inspection).
244 See, e.g., Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of
Alternate Practices, in STUDY ON AsYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum-seekers/legalAssist.pdf. The
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom found that in expedited
removal cases, where many of the applicants are in detention, unrepresented respondents
succeeded only 2% of the time, while those with counsel succeeded 25% of the time. Id.
at 239.
245 This is an attribute that distinguishes deportation proceedings from criminal proceed-
ings. Since the vast majority of criminal proceedings are resolved through plea bargain-
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the Court would define the scope of the right as: the right to be
screened for appointment by an impartial entity to determine wheth-
er there is a legal issue or factual hearing likely, which would warrant
appointment of counsel in a given case. I do not mean to suggest
that any of these are the optimal or likely outcome. I only intend to
demonstrate how, even if the Court determines it should apply a hard
floor model, we cannot assume the right will operate in precisely the
same way as in criminal proceedings.
This three step inquiry-(1) Does the right apply meaningfully in
deportation proceedings? (2) Does the nature of the proceedings
and the respondent warrant a hard floor model? and (3) What is the
scope of the hard floor right to be applied?-is a. mechanism by
which courts can begin to make principled determination under the
Padilla conception of deportation regarding which criminal rights
should apply in deportation proceeding and how to apply them.
CONCLUSION
We stand at the doorstep of a significant, even radical, reconcep-
tualization of the nature of deportation, and Padilla is the foot in that
door. Commentators have been knocking for decades, decrying the
incoherent state of the current conception of deportation as purely
civil and arguing against the formalist reasoning that has denied im-
migrants a level of procedural protection commensurate with the
gravity of deportation proceedings. Whether the Court will ulti-
mately step through the door and overrule Fong Yue Ting and whole-
ing, attorneys add significant value-because of their expertise in plea negotiation-even
in those cases where no substantive legal issues or factual hearings are likely. In contrast,
deportation proceedings are rarely resolved through plea agreement. But cf 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(d) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall provide by regulation for the entry by an
immigration judge of an order of removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien's repre-
sentative) ... [which] shall constitute a conclusive determination of the alien's remova-
bility from the United States."); Jayashri Srikantiah & Karen Tumlin, Nat'l Immigration
Law Ctr., Backgrounder: Stipulated Removal, available at http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/removpsds/stipulated-removal-bkgrndr-
2 0 0 8-1 I.pdf (discussing "due
process concerns about the use of the stipulated removal program [and] the program's
staggering expansion over the past five years"); Legomsky, supra note 28, at 494-95 (dis-
cussing how "[c]riminal-style plea bargaining has seeped into" immigration law in situa-
tions where "[p]olice and prosecutors grant permission to remain at least temporarily in
the United States rather than initiate removal proceedings, in exchange for the willing-
ness of a minor player to cooperate in securing the convictions of those who played more
major roles" and also in the asylum context, through "a growing practice among some
immigration judges to offer applicants withholding of removal in exchange for withdraw-
ing their applications for asylum").
246 See supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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heartedly adopt the Padilla conception of deportation as straddling
the civil-criminal divide is, of course, impossible to predict.
The stakes could not be higher for immigrants facing deportation,
including, for example, the right to appointed counsel, the protec-
tions against disproportionate punishment, assurance that the rules
of the game cannot be changed retroactively, and an end to the regu-
lar practice of detaining immigrants for their deportation proceed-
ings in remote locations thousands of miles away from their homes in
the United States. By every objective measure, deportation has never
before been such a pervasive feature of American society and never
before been so connected to the criminal process . 2 4  As the laws tar-
geting immigrants for deportation grow harsher by the year and as
criminal and immigration law continue to become ever more entan-
gled, the dissonance with civil label has reached a crescendo. Until
Padilla, there was little reason to be hopeful that the Court was ready
to address the growing incoherence. Padilla gives us reason to hope.
247 Julia Preston, Administration Spares Students in Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8 2010, at Al,
A12 (noting that the Obama administration deported a record 389,834 people in fiscal
year 2009 and has deported a record 142,526 immigrants convicted of crimes in the be-
tween October 2009 and August 2010). ICE's budget for fiscal year 2010 was $5.7 billion,
which represents a 60% increase in funding since fiscal year 2005. Compare ICE Budget
Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/#Chief Financial Officer-Management and
Budget (last visited May 11, 2011), with ICE Budget Fact Sheet. Fiscal Year 2005, U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
library/factsheets/pdf/2005budgetfactsheet.pdf. ICE's detention capacity has ballooned
from 7500 beds in 1995 to over 30,000 today, see SCHRIRO, supra note 10, at 2, and for the
first time in U.S. history, a full 50% of respondents in deportation proceedings were de-
tained in fiscal year 2009, up from under 30% just four years ago. EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK fig. 23 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.
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